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TILE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SHERMAN L. COHN *
The amendments to the civil rules continue a process of transition
from legal formulas toward adaptation to the practicalities of the
various factual situations involved. This process was commenced
with the early reform movement when the strictures of common-law,
form-of-action pleading were abolished and the artificial separation of
law and equity was ended. It continued through the original promul-
gation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which attempted to
eliminate many of the legalistic but artificial restrictions that code
practice perpetuated. The current amendments move closer to what
Mr. Justice Goldberg termed "the aims of a liberal, nontechnical
application" of federal procedural rules, rules that are designed to
place before the court the actual substantive issues in the case with
the minimum amount of formal procedural restrictions needed to
ensure fair and orderly proceedings.
PARTIES
The major area of modification in the current amendments con-
cerns parties. Here there is a restructuring of major proportions
to eliminate formalistic labels that restricted many courts from an
examination of the practical factors of individual cases. In some
respects the new rules codify existing practice.
The first change that bears examination involves the required
joinder of parties. The trichotomy of proper-necessary-indispensable,
long a problem in understanding and definition, is now overthrown
in favor of a consideration of practical factors in light of the ques-
tion: Should this case go forward without the missing party?
JOINDER OF PARTIES NEEDED FOR
JUST ADJUDICATION-RULE 19
The concept of compulsory joinder of parties developed in the
equity courts.' Indeed, rule 19, as it has read since the inception of
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S.F.S., LL.B.,
LL.M., Georgetown University. The author until September 1965 was Assistant Chief,
Appellate Section, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice. He is chairman
of the Committees on Federal Rules and Procedure and on Federal Appellate Rules, of
the Federal Bar Association.
1 For a thorough discussion of the background of the rules governing parties to equity
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the federal rules, was derived directly from the federal courts' equity
rules.2 At equity, whether an absent person was required to be
present in an action was decided upon a consideration of several
factors. The effect that disposition of the action would have on the
absentee8 and upon the parties already before the court,4 was investi-
gated. Additionally, the courts weighed the public interest of avoiding
multitudinous litigation of an issue against the ability of the court to
render a meaningful decree.5  As compulsory joinder developed, the
terms "indispensable," "necessary," and "proper" were coined. "Joint
interest" in the subject matter of the action also became common
parlance.6
These technical concepts were retained in original rule 19.' An
"indispensable" party came to mean one who has a "joint interest" in
the action, and in whose absence, the action could not proceed.8 A
"necessary" party was one who had an interest in the action, but
whose interest was separable; in its discretion, a court could proceed
with or dismiss the action if such person could not be joined.9 "Proper"
parties were those having an interest in the action but whose presence
suits from the late seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century, see Hazard,
Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REv.
1254 (1961). For an analysis of the indispensable party rule from the nineteenth century
to the present see Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pts. 1-2), 55
Mica. L. REV. 327, 483 (1957).
2 Compare Equity R. 37, 226 U.S. 659 (1912), and Equity R. 39, 226 U.S. 659 (1912),
'with FED. R. CIv. P. 19 (a) and FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (b).
8 See, e.g., Northern Ind. R.R. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 56 U.S. (15 How.) 233, 244-46
(1853) ; Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216, 219-20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 782 (1946) ; Roos v. Texas Co., 23 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S.
587 (1928); Developments in the Law-Multliparly Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71
HARv. L. REV. 874, 880, 882-84 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Multiparty Litigation].
4 See, e.g., Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. RCA, 269 U.S. 459, 468 (1926) ; Young v.
Powell, 179 F.2d 147, 150-52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 948 (1950); Multiparty
Litigation 880, 881-82.
G 2 BARRON & HOLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACtiCE AND PROCEDURE § 512, at 97-98 (Wright ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HOLTzOFF]; Reed, supra note 1, at 330; Multiparty
Litigation 880, 881-82.
6 For an analysis of the numerous definitions of "joint interest" see 2 BARRON &
HoLTzoFF § 512. See also WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 70, at 261-62 (1963).
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 19; see Multiparty Litigation 879; Note, Multiparty Litigation: Pro-
posed Changes in the Federal Rules, 50 IowA L. REv. 1135, 1137-38 (1965).
8 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 511, at 85.
9 Id. § 511, at 86.
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was not prerequisite to granting relief.10 Joinder of proper parties
was regulated by rule 20.11
With the crystallization of these abstract classifications, the policy
considerations for joinder of parties were often obscured and dis-
torted. Some courts applied the definition of "indispensable" as a
legal formula without consideration of the "equities" of the case. 12
Other courts, after examining relevant factors, would interpret the
various definitions in order to provide some relief to parties already
before it.'a The result was a conflicting and confusing body of prece-
dent on joinder of parties.
The Advisory Committee's Note points out several defects in
present rule 19. The description of persons whose joinder was desir-
able-"persons ... who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be
accorded between those already parties"' 4-was inadequate. The
equation of "indispensable" with "joint interest" was misleading.
"[P]ersons holding an interest technically 'joint' are not always so
related to an action that it would be unwise to proceed without joining
all of them, whereas persons holding an interest not technically 'joint'
may have this relation to an action."' 5 Additionally, the Advisory
Committee believed that the "legalisms" of the old rule were respon-
sible for the courts' avoidance of controlling pragmatic considerations
and their failure to delineate the bases of their decisions.
A misinterpretation, termed a "jurisdictional fallacy," was also
caused by the wording of original rule 19, which stated that, to be
feasible, joinder of the absent party could not deprive "the court ofjurisdiction of the parties." Some courts incorrectly inferred that,
if an indispensable party could not be joined, they were thereby
deprived of jurisdiction of the parties presently before them. 16 The
language responsible for this "fallacy" has been revised. The new
rule states explicitly that a person described in rule 19(a) (1)-(2)
'Old. § 511, at 88-90.
11 Fn. R. Cmv. P. 20.12 E.g., Fouke v. Schenewerk, 197 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1952). For a discussion of this
case see Hazard, suPra note 1, at 1288-89.
13 E.g., Parker Rust-Proof Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 105 F.2d 976 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 597 (1939); Benger Labs. Ltd. v. R. K. Laros Co., 24 F.R.D. 450
(E.D. Pa. 1959).
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (b).
15 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 19.
10 See, e.g., Miller v. Mangus, 125 F.2d 507, 511 (10th Cir.), reed, 317 U.S. 178 (1942);
Peterson v. Sucro, 93 F.2d 878, 881 (4th Cir. 1938).
1206
can be joined only if he does not divest the court of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action. It is now clear that the absence of
such a person will not affect the court's jurisdiction over the parties
before it.
New rule 19 shifts focus from the-present indispensable-necessary-
proper trichotomy. Its primary concern is the practical feasibility of
joinder of parties; the legalisms of the old rule have been discarded. 17
Accordingly, the new rule sets out pragmatic and equitable factors
for courts to consider in determining whether to proceed with or
dismiss a case. It states:
A person . . .shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter im-
pair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.18
Several policy considerations are expressed in this definition. Sub-
section (1) points out the desirability of joining all parties necessary
for granting complete relief. "The interests that are being furthered
here are not only those of the parties before the court, but also that
of the public in avoiding repeated lawsuits on the same essential
subject matter."' 9 The ability of the absent party to protect his
interest in the action is stressed in subsection (a) (2) (i), while sub-
section (a) (2) (ii) calls attention to possible risks to the already
present parties if the absent party is not joined.
This definition represents a change from the March 1964 proposal
of the Advisory Committee. Subsection (a) (2) (i) of the 1964
proposal reads: "as a practical matter substantially impair or impede
17 In the 1964- proposed amendments, the legal technicalities of the indispensable-
necessary-proper party trichotomy were also discarded. However, the term "contingently
necessary" party was used in its place. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments, 34 F.R.D. 325, 379 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Pre-
liminary Draft]. The new rule uses no labels, but incorporates the definition of "con-
tingently necessary" into its text. For discussions of the 1964 proposals see Fink, Indis-
pensable Parties and the Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 19, 74 YALE L.J. 403
(1965); Note, Multiparty Litigation: Proposed Changes in the Federal Rules, 50 IowA
L. REv. 1135 (1965) ; Comment, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Attacking the Party
Problem, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 80 (1965).
18 New rule 19(a).
19 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 19 (a).
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his ability to protect that interest." 20 In the new rule, the word
"substantially" has been omitted in this subsection, although it has
been retained in subsection (a) (2) (ii). Thus, more emphasis seems
to be accorded to the effect of disposition of an action upon the
absent party than upon those already present. Such a distinction is not
surprising, as courts have held that if the risk to the present parties
is too remote it may be disregarded and the action may proceed to
disposition.21
Consistent with the old rule, the court shall order persons described
in rule 19 (a) (1)-(2) to be joined if they have not already been so.
Also, if the absent party should be joined as a plaintiff but refuses,
"he may be made a defendant, or in a proper case, an involuntary
plaintiff. ' 22 When a party described in these subsections cannot be
joined, rule 19(b) directs the court to consider whether "in equity
and good conscience" 2 the action should proceed or be dismissed.
20 Preliminary Draft 379.
21 E.g., Wesson v. Crain, 165 F.2d 6, 10 (8th Cir. 1948).
22 Also, the Advisory Committee notes that the new rule does not affect prior authority
holding that "a tortfeasor with the usual 'joint-and-several' liability is merely a permis-
sive party to an action against another with the same liability." Advisory Committee's
Note to new rule 19(a). The Advisory Committee's Note also refers to the special
problem existing when a party sues a subordinate federal official and the question arises
as to whether the defendant's superior has to be joined in the action. Ibid. The United
States Supreme Court has held, in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 54 (1955), that
this determination was to be governed by practical considerations, but that where the
superior must play a part in carrying out the relief granted, he must be joined. Williams
v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 493 (1947); see Boyse, Proposed Reforms in Federal Non-
statutory Judicial Revieqw: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75
HARv. L. REv. 1479, 1493-99 (1962). The new rule does not attempt to deal specifically
with the situation, but the Advisory Committee believes that the new rule seems "better
adapted to handle [the issue of joinder] . . . than its predecessor provision." Advisory
Committee's Note to new rule 19(b). In view of recently enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)
(1964), permitting a suit against a government official anywhere in the United States, and
28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), giving all district courts mandamus jurisdiction as against
government officials, and in view of the amendments to rule 15(c), permitting an amend-
ment to a complaint to relate back where another defendant is joined in this situation,
the problem should no longer be significant.
23 This phrase is found in Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 (1854),
where the Supreme Court laid down a test to determine whether an absent party was
indispensable. For discussions of this landmark case see Reed, supra note 1, at 340-56;
Multiparty Litigation 879-80; Note, Multiparty Litigation: Proposed Changes in the
Federal Rules, 50 IowA L. REv. 1135, 1139-40 (1965). For an analysis of "equity and
good conscience" see Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading
Rules, 36 MINN. L. Rv. 580, 598-600 (1952).
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In favor of balancing the interests of all parties concerned,24 the new
rule thus avoids the "pigeoned-holed" determinations that the terms
of the old rule required.
Section (b) of rule 19 sets out four "factors to be considered by
the court" which the Advisory Committee's Note makes dear are
not to be exclusive. The first factor directs inquiry to any prejudice
that a judgment might cause the absentee and those parties already
present. This is essentially a reiteration of the interests stressed in
the definition in subsection (a) (2). The second factor is concerned
with the possibility of "shaping relief" to avoid any prejudice found
under the first factor. Measures which were used under old rule 19
without express reference, such as protective provisions25 and alterna-
tive forms of relief,26 are specifically indorsed by the new rule. Also,
the Advisory Committee's Note suggests other measures which a
party can employ to lessen or avoid prejudice. The defending party
who is present might try to bring the absent party into the action by
defensive interpleader 28 or suggest to him that he may have a counter-
claim under rule 13 (h) .29 The absent party might appear in the
24 Section (c) of rule 19 has also been reworded to reflect the changes in sections (a)
and (b). However, it still provides that reasons for nonjoinder and names of parties not
joined, if known, must be pleaded. The section appears more forceful now since joinder
of parties has been liberalized. Section (d) of the new rule, derived from the first
sentence of old rule 19(a), subjects the rule to the provisions of rule 23, dealing with
class actions.
In accordance with the change in rule 19, rule 13 (h) has been simplified and clarified.
The Advisory Committee reasoned that rule 13 (h) had "partaken of some of the textual
difficulties of Rule 19" and thus should be reworded. Advisory Committee's Note to new
rule 13 (h). For a discussion of old rule 13 (h) see Multiparty Litigation 971-72. Simi-
larly, other conforming amendments have been made in rules 4(f), 12(b) (7), 12(h) (2),
and 41 (b).
25 See, e.g., Roos v. Texas Co., 23 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S.
587 (1928) (impounding part of plaintiff's recovery considered) ; Atwood v. Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Co., 275 F.2d 513, 519 (1st Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 661 (1922).
26 Ward v. Deavers, 92 U.S. App. D.C. 167, 203 F.2d 72 (1953) (damages for fraud
awarded against present defendant where rescission not possible due to absence of some
parties to contract).
27 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 19 (b).
28 This was suggested in Gauss v. Kirk, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 80, 83, 198 F.2d 83, 86
(1952), and in Hudson v. Newell, 172 F.2d 848, 852, modified, 174 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.
1949). See also Multiparty Litigation 882.
29 Abel v. Brayton Flying Serv., Inc., 248 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir. 1949); Multiparty
Litigation 882.
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action voluntarily to protect his interests, or he could attempt to
intervene on an ancillary basis.80
A third factor for the court to consider is "whether a judgment
rendered in the person's absence will be adequate." The inquiry here
is whether the court's decree will provide the litigants with a satis-
factory remedy. This provision naturally overlaps with the second
factor.
The fourth consideration looks to the practical effect on the plain-
tiff of dismissal for nonjoinder. This is perhaps the most startling
change, for in the formulation of the rule to date the one party whose
interest was overlooked was the plaintiff. If a party indispensable
under the old rule could not be joined, the plaintiff was out of court; 81
the rule articulated no consideration as to whether there existed an
alternative forum in which an action could be brought.82 The court
often ameliorated this hardship by either circumventing it88 or simply
ignoring it. 4 New rule 19 now makes it a pertinent consideration
for the court.
Although the formulation in 19 (b) is a definite departure from the
format of old rule 19, it is in reality a recitation of the factors that
courts considered in applying that rule.85 Codifying these considera-
tions and excising prior legalisms hopefully will free the courts from
possible automatic application of labels to situations which upon
analysis are inapposite.
One unfortunate aspect of the new rule is the utilization of the old
label "indispensable" to represent an apparently new concept. The
new rule states that "the court shall determine whether, in equity
80 See Johnson v. Middleton, 175 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1949); Kentucky Natural Gas
Corp. v. Duggins, 165 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1948); McComb v. McCormack, 159 F.2d 219
(5th Cir. 1947).
81 Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854); Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164
F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948) ; Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal &
Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 782 (1946) ; Chadbourne v. Coe,
51 Fed. 479 (8th Cir. 1892).
82 See JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 421-22 (1965).
88 See id. at 422-25; WRoir, FEDERAL COURTS § 70, at 262-63 (1963).
84 See Parker Rust-Proof Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 105 F.2d 976 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 597 (1939); Benger Labs. Ltd. v. R. K. Laros Co., 24 F.R.D. 450 (E.D.
Pa. 1959).
35 See Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal, and Alpellate Procedure,
35 F.R.D. 317, 336 (1964); Note, Multiparty Litigation: Proposed Changes in the Federal
Rules, 50 IowA L. REv. 1135, 1147 (1965).
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and good conscience the action . . . should be dismissed, the absent
person being thus regarded as indispensable."86 The Advisory Com-
mittee's Note explains that the word "indispensable" is used in a
conclusory sense only. 7 In other words, a person is "indispensable"
when, after consideration of the proper factors, the court determines
that he cannot be made a party and that the action cannot proceed
without him. This explanation seems inadequate, for the word if
only conclusory adds nothing to the meaning of the rule, and, despite
the disclaimer of the Advisory Committee, it is too easy for courts
to use the word "indispensable" as a link to the old rule and its old
formalistic concepts. Upon this ground, the bulk of conflicting
precedent may be deemed applicable to the new rule, and the special
classifications of old rule 19 may survive. Such an approach would
certainly be inconsistent with the purpose of the change in the rule. 8
New rule 19 gives extensive discretion to the district courts. Under
the rule, the district court is to decide whether to proceed with or
dismiss a particular case after weighing the relevant factors. This
grant of discretion has experienced a mixed reception.3 9 One effect
would seem to be a reduction in appellate review of joinder ques-
tions since review would only be justified for an abuse of the district
court's discretion. In addition, more individualized treatment of
the particular case will result since there should be fewer summary
dismissals due to failure to observe technicalities.
JOINDER OF CLAIMS IN MULTIPARTY ACTIONS-RULE 18(a)
Under old rule 18(a), in a single party action the plaintiff and
defendant could join as many claims and counterclaims in their plead-
30 New rule 19(b). (Emphasis added.)
3 7 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 19 (b).
8 The Advisory Committee notes that "experience showed that the rule [rule 19] was
defective in its phrasing and did not point clearly to the proper basis of decision." Ibid.
Moreover, "indispensable" is used in new rule 12(h) (2) with reference to rule 19, and
its presence there is not explained in the Advisory Committee's Note to that subsection,
thus leaving another opportunity for the importation of the old concepts.
89 Compare Federal Court Comm. to the Board of Governors, Report on Proposed
Changes in the Civil Rules, 37 F.R.D. 75, 76 (1965), and Order, 86 Sup. Ct. No. 11, it 204
(1966) (Black, J., dissenting), with Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal,
and Appellate Procedure, 35 F.R.D. 317, 337 (1964), and Note, Multiparty Litigation:
Proposed Changes in the Federal Rules, 50 IowA L. REv. 1135, 1149, 1152-53 (1965).
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ings as each had against the other 40 This policy of liberal joinder
extended to multiparty cases. However, some courts inferred from
the wording of the original rule41 that the standards of old rules 19,
20, and 22 related to and limited rule 18 (a) in multiple party cases.42
A major problem concerned rule 20 (a) (permissive joinder) which
provided that: "All persons may join in one action.., if they assert
[or there is asserted against them] any right to relief ... in respect
of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common
to all of them will arise in the action. ' 48 The phrase "of them" was
read as referring to the claims sought to be joined rather than the
parties. Consequently, unless each claim arose from a single trans-
action or series of transactions and involved a question common to all
defendants, it could not be joined. A further restriction on joinder
resulted from this construction of rule 20 (a). Where a defendant
attempted to join an independent claim against a third party to the
original action in a multiparty case, joinder was not allowed. 44
The most often cited case propounding a restrictive view of joinder
of claims was Federal Housing Adm'r v. Christianson.4 5 In that
case, an indorsee sued three co-makers of a note. In the same action he
sought to join a claim on a second note made by two of the defendants
Joinder of parties on the first claim was proper under old rule 20 (a).
The court, however, held that joinder of the claim on the second
note was improper because that claim arose in a separate transaction
and did not involve a question common to all three defendants.
Placing the burden on the trial court at the pleading stage was to
402 BARRON & HoLTzoFF § 501, at 66; WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTs § 78, at 296 (1963);
Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 13 (1938).
41 "There may be a like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties if the require-
ments of Rules 19 [necessary joinder of parties], 20 [permissive joinder of parties], and
22 [interpleader] are satisfied." FED. R. Civ. P. 18 (a).
42 For an analysis of authorities see 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 533.1, at 198-202; 3
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 18.04(3) (2d ed. 1963). For discussions of the various in-
terpretations of old rule 18(a) see Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern
Pleading Rules, 36 MINN. L. Ray. 580, 582-97 (1952) ; Commentary on the Relation Be-
tween Joinder of Parties and Joinder of Claims, 5 FED. RuLEs SERe. 822 (1942) ; Multi-
party Litigation 967-73.
43 FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a). (Emphasis added.)
44 C. W. Humphrey v. Security Alum. Co., 31 F.R.D. 41, 44 (E.D. Mich. 1962) ; United
States v. Scott, 18 F.R.D. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Contra, Nolan Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co., 301 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1962).
45 26 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1939).
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introduce real possibilities for delay. The Christianson court itself
did not exclude the possibility that the claims could later be consoli-
dated for trial under rule 42 (a) ; by the same token, if permitted at
pleading and later found burdensome, they might be severed at trial
under rule 42 (b). These alternatives illustrate that the Christianson
decision promoted unnecessary niceties of pleading, precisely what
the federal rules were designed to eliminate. Consequently, rule
18 (a) was revised to overcome the Christianson decision and similar
authority.4 Rule 20 (a) was also reworded to remove any ambiguity
as to the antecedent of the word "them." 47
New rule 18 (a) clearly states that any and all claims of one
party against an opposing. party may be joined either as independent
or alternative claims. The fact that there are multiple parties is to
be of no consequence. Joinder of parties, regulated by new rule 19,
is an independent consideration. This new rule should not raise any
problems. It simply clarifies the interpretation which was intended
for the old rule. That any and all claims may be joined at the pleading
stage will not unduly confuse the issues in the case, for claims are
subject to separation under rule 42 (b) when fairness and convenience
require.48
CLASS SUITS AND RELATED ACTIONS
-RULES 23, 23.1 AND 23.2
Another area in which the procedural requirements for the joinder
of parties are greatly altered is the class action, rule 23. Here overly
formal classifications have been rejected for pragmatic considerations.
The present trichotomy of true, hydrid, and spurious class actions49
is put to rest. As the Advisory Committee points out, the expected
advantages of this tripartite categorization did not materialize,
40 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 18 (a).
47 "of them" with respect to plaintiffs now reads "these persons" and with respect to
defendants now reads "defendants." New rule 20(a).
48 The new rule "does not purport to deal with questions of jurisdictioni or venue."
Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 1S(a). Under the new rule, all claims "legal,
equitable, or maritime" may be joined. This is in accord with the unification of admiralty
and civil procedure effected by the amended rules. Ibid.
49 These terms were originally advanced by Professor Moore. Moore, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551
(1937). For discussions of the problems raised by these classifications see Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to new rule 23; Note, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 818 (1946) ; Multiparty Litigation;
Note, 32 U. CH. L. REv. 768 (1965); Note, 51 VA. L. Rav. 629 (1965).
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certainly as to the type of class action brought and the legal con-
sequences."° The exact definitions of the trichotomy proved elusive
in application: Some courts contracted and expanded them to arrive
at pragmatic solutions whereas other courts strictly applied the
formal classifications. 5'
This complete overhaul of rule 23 significantly expands the scope
of class actions. As with joinder of parties under rule 19, the district
judge, unhampered by traditional classifications, is given a large
measure of discretion in balancing conflicting interests. Although it
has been suggested that the court hearing a class action is in a poor
position to determine fairness and adequacy of representation,52
the amended rule adopts the position of the many authorities that
trust the ability of the trial court to decide these issues when aided
by a procedure that contains built-in flexibility.53
Section (a) of the amended rule enumerates four requirements
for a class action which are labeled "prerequisites" :
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
While failure to meet any of the first three requirements would prob-
ably be grounds for immediately stripping the action of its class
character, it is suggested that a deficiency with respect to the fourth
should be used to rescind class status in most cases only after the
class parties have been given an opportunity to bring in additional
members-a procedure provided in section (d) of the amended rule.
Meeting these four prerequisites alone, however, is not sufficient for
maintaining a class action. One additional requirement must be met,
but this may be done by any of four alternative means set forth in
section (b). These four alternatives, which may be said to have
50 See 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 561, at 259.
5 1 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 23. See generally ibid.
52 Note, Binding Effect of Class .4ctions, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1059, 1060 (1954).
1532 BARRON & HoLTzoFF § 572, at 351-52; CHAFFEE, SOME PROBLEMS IN EQurrY 288-
95; 76 HARv. L. Rav. 1675, 1678-79 (1963); see Kansas City v. Williams, 205 F.2d 47,
52 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953) ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945).
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replaced the true-hybrid-spurious trichotomy, of the old rule, are as
follows:'
'(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing 'the class, or
(B) adjudications with' respect to individual members of the class'which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other mem-
bers not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
.relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or'fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy .
It should be noted that the amended rule -abandons any attempt
to draw distinctions between joint, common, secondary, or several
rights, 4 thereby abandoning the common-law legalisms- that were
brought into federal procedure by the old rule.
Subsection (b) (1) appears to encompass the actions that under
the old rule could be classified as true or hybrid, in that it emphasizes
the possibility of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would
dispose of the interests of the members of the class who are not
parties to the action. Thus actions which are determinative of the
common-law classification of joint rights or which affect specific
property in which several persons have claims would fall within
this requirement. However, the provision is much broader. For now
there is no need to be concerned with fitting the common-law label of
joint or secondary right. Nor must the class action tend, to create a
legal bar to or practically destroy the right of absent members.
5 The Advisory Committee succinctly stated its objectives. in the notes to rule 23:
The amended rule describes in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining
class actions; provides that all class actions maintained to the end as such will result
in judgments including those whom the court finds to be members of the class,
whether or not the judgment is favorable to the class; and refers to the measures
which can be taken to assure the fair conduct of these actions.
Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 23.
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Instead it is sufficient if the adjudication would "as a practical matter
be dispositive" of the rights of absent members of the class, "or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests."
Subsection (b) (2) is new. It will place into the rule procedures
now used in class actions brought to force or prevent action that really
concerns members of a class individually-cases concerning racial
discrimination, apportionment of legislatures, required prayer sessions
in school come immediately to mind. The Advisory Committee sug-
gests that certain antitrust actions also fall within this subsection.
Here again the rule appears to be catching up to the present day
practice of many courts.
The thoughtfully drafted subsection (b) (3) largely covers the
former spurious class action, although portions of the old spurious
action are now in subsection (b) (2). For a (b) (3) action, the
court must make an affirmative finding that the class action device
is superior to other available methods of disposing of the contro-
versy; 5 this is reminiscent of the equitable origin of the class action
in that it may be barred if an adequate remedy at law exists. The
court must also determine whether the common questions of law and
fact dominate questions affecting the individual members of the class.
In making these determinations, the judge is directed to weigh four
factors, which are not to be considered exhaustive:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the pros-
ecution or defense of separate actions; ( B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against mem-
bers of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to
be encountered in the management of a class action.
Again the pragmatic approach of the rule can be seen. And again
there is an attempt to place into the new rule elements that have
often in fact been considered under the old.
Another area of important change can be found in section (c)
which establishes significant procedures to be followed in class actions.
5 For other specific forms of relief see Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Func-
tion of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REY. 684, 686-91 (1941); Note, 32 U. CHI. L. R v. 768,
784-85 (1965). Discussing New York procedure, one author suggests that the use of a
"test case" may be superior to the class action, and that, in some cases, the force of
stare decisis would make a simple action as efficacious as a class action. Weinstein,
Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. Rav. 433, 44647
(1960).
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First there is a direction that the court shall determine as soon as
practicable after the bringing of the suit whether it is to be maintained
as a class action."8 Thus at the outset the court must actively focus
on the most efficacious way of resolving the dispute before it. Should
the court determine that the case is properly a (b) (3) action, it
must direct that all members of the class be given notice of the
action.57 This notice is to be Sent personally to all members of the
class who can be identified through reasonable effort; for others
the requirement is satisfied by the "best notice practicable under the
circumstances." The notice is to advise each member of the (b) (3)
class that he will be excluded from the action if he so requests, but
that if he does not exclude himself within the time specified by the
court, he will be bound by the judgment. He is also to be advised
that if he does not exclude himself he is entitled to enter an appear-
56 See 76 HARv. L. REV. 1675, 1678 (1963).
57 To insure meeting the requirements of due process, the notice requirement of new
rule 23 is patterned after Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950). In Mullane, the Court considered whether newspaper-published notice to bene-
ficiaries of a consolidated trust was sufficient to make a statutorily required accounting
by a state court binding against them. The Court pointed out that "there can be no
doubt that at a minimum they [the words of the due process clause] require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and op-
portunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Id. at 313. Observing that
"personal service has not in all circumstances been regarded as indispensable to the
process due to residents," the Court stated the notice must be "reasonably calculated,
under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314. The Court found
due process required that all known beneficiaries receive notice by mail, but it was
indicated that unknown beneficiaries would be bound if newspaper-published notice
were given in accordance with state law. Id. at 318-19.
It has been submitted that the threat of widespread notice of a lawsuit could be
utilized as a coercive device by the plaintiff to extract a settlement from a defendant
who did not care to be subjected to adverse publicity. Note, 32 U. CHi. L. REV. 768,
780-82 (1965). The authors also suggest that the automatic inclusion of the entire class
under the judgment increases the temptation to utilize court notice for champertous
solicitation of clients by lawyers championing the cause of a class. Ibid. In Cherner v.
Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962), Judge Wyzanski con-
ceded that the court had the power to order notice be given to absent "members"
in a spurious class action, but declined to exercise this power due to the dangers of its
being used for client solicitation and of the members thus inferring that the court con-
sidered the action well-founded. Id. at 936-37. Under the new rule, the problem is one
for the local courts and bar associations.
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ance.58 Whether notice is to be given in (b) (1) or (b) (2) actions is
left to the discretion of the court.59
Section (c) also gives directions as to the judgment. A judgment
in (b) (1) or (b) (2) class actions is to "include and describe those
whom the court finds to be members of the class." A judgment
in a (b) (3) action is to "include and specify or describe" those to
whom notice was directed who are found to be members of the class
and who .have not excluded themselves. Finally, subsection (c) (4)
permits an action to be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues only, and permits a class to be divided
into subclasses with each subclass thereafter treated as a class.00
By section (d) of rule 23, the court is given express authority
to issue orders controlling the conduct of the class litigation. This
authority has undoubtedly existed in the district court prior to the
new rule,"' but by specifying a nonexclusive list of possible orders,
the new rule focuses the attention of court and counsel on the proper
conduct of a class action. A court may prescribe procedures for the
prevention of undue repetition or complication in presentation of evi-
dence or argument; it may require that all or some members of the
class begiven notice of any step in the proceeding, or of the opportunity
to signify during the proceedings whether they consider themselves
fairly and adequately represented, or whether they wish to "intervene
in" the action to present claims or defenses, "or otherwise to come
into the action" ;62 it may require that the pleadings be amended to
strike allegations as to representation of absent parties and that the
case proceed as a nonclass action.
Finally, section (e) retains the provision of the old rule that
58 There should be no reason why the statute of limitations cruld have any effect
on a class member's entering an appearance, though the judge, may limit such ap-
pearances as he sees fit.
59 An order to this effect is suggested by new rule 23 (d) (2).
60 This power is analogous to that conferred by FED. R. Civ. P. 42. See Note, 51 VA.
L. Rav. 629, 643 n.44 (1965), for a discussion of whether a class action conducted as
such only as to certain issues interferes with the right to trial by jury.
61 E.g., Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934, 935 (D. Mass.
1962).
"62Presumably this could include an invitation to enter an appearance similar to
that which the courts are bound to extend to (b)(3) class members. The value of
this invitation would depend on what rights the court decided to bestow on a nonparty
member who entered an appearance.
a class action is not to be dismissed or compromised without court
approval. But under the new rule, the court must direct that notice
of such proposed action be given to all members of the class regard-
less of the nature of the action. 3
The new rule poses the dilemma that despite the express disclaimer
of expansion of jurisdiction in rule 82, a literal adherence to the
commands of rule 23 would extend jurisdiction to citizens not pre-
viously within the court's power. That is, inclusion of all members of
the former spurious class in the judgment-the clear mandate of
rule 23-could be construed as changing the manner of meeting the
requirements of diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount.
Generally, diversity jurisdiction principles require that the citizen-
ship of each party on one side of the action be diverse to that of each
opposing party.64 However, under the elusive doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction, federal courts in varying situations have entertained
causes without the requisite diversity. 5 The proximity of an inter-
venor's claim to the main action determines the availability of ancil-
lary jurisdiction;66 the theory generally extends to intervention of
right, rule 24(a), but not to permissive intervention under 24(b).67
Under the old rule, true or hybrid class members, theoretically, could
intervene of right regardless of citizenship if they could show a
possibility of inadequate representation. 8 But since nonparty mem-
bers of a spurious class would not be bound by a judgment, they could
not intervene of right and had to meet the citizenship requirement in
most cases. °9 .
What formerly were spurious class actions now fall within sub-
sections (b) (2) and (b) (3) of new rule 23. Covered by (b) (2)
are actions concerning various types of discrimination. Since the
right of a child to nondiscriminatory education and the right of a
citizen to equal voting power are individual to the person affected,
63 Under the old rule, the court was required to give notice of proposed dismissal
or compromise only in the case of a "true" class action. FEn. R. Civ. P. 23 (c).
64 WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 24, at 71-72 (1963).
65,d. § 9, § 76, at 286. See also Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of
Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1964) (rules do not expand ancillary
jurisdiction of federal courts but provide opportunities for invoking it' in additional
situations).
06 WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTS § 76, at 286 (1963).
o7 Id. § 9, at 19.
68 Id. § 72, at 271. But see notes 104-07 infra and accompanying text.
69 See id. § 72, at 271-72.
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litigation arising from these rights was sometimes treated as a
spurious class action.70 Many cases falling within this category will
create no diversity problem because discrimination in education,
reapportionment, and like cases raise federal questions. But where,
for example, a suit is maintained by the members of a union for
injunctive relief, the diversity question may well arise. The extraction
of this type of action from the section corresponding to the old spuri-
ous-action subdivision could well be construed to relieve it of the
previous complete diversity requirement.
More serious questions concerning diversity will arise in the (b) (3)
actions. Under the old rules, a class member is outside the bounds of
the spurious-action judgment unless he opts in, at which time the
jurisdictional question is posed. However, the scheme of the new
rule leaves all members of the class within the judgment unless they
opt out.71 Further, there is no requirement in the new rule for a
showing of the citizenship of these absent members. The sole concern
now is with adequate representation, notice, and fairness of procedure.
Indeed, there appears to be no contemplation that any official record
will indicate the citizenship of absent parties-parties who will now
be bound by the judgment. Thus again, there is an implication that
the diversity requirements imposed under the old rule are to be
relaxed.
The result may be that courts, observing that the Advisory Com-
mittee's Note indicates no express intent to change jurisdictional
requirements, will determine that in (b) (2) and (b) (3) actions,
70 Id. § 72, at 270-71.
71 This change has been disapproved in Comm. on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Judicial Conference-Ninth Circuit, Supplemental Report, 37 F.R.D. 71, 76-77 (1965).
This committee also forsees practical problems resulting from binding absent class
members:
If the plaintiffs representing the class receive a favorable decision, in many cases
other potential plaintiffs suddenly will be presented with an opportunity to merely
prove damages and collect. In the wake of a favorable class action numerous
potential plaintiffs may feel compelled to prove damages. Litigation will generally
be encouraged; the incentive to settle, diminished. Indeed, under such circum-
stances, if the potential plaintiffs are corporations, it may constitute an abuse of
management powers to fail to proceed against the defendant.
Id. at 81. An answer to this is contained in a letter in the same report: "I cannot
imagine District Judges making extensive use of [23(b) (3)] ...to bind absent parties
where there was not ample justification, amounting to virtual compulsion, for doing so
and assurance of fair and adequate representation of all interests and parties involved."
Id. at 91.
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there can be no expansion.72 Thus as far as diversity is concerned,
we could be left substantially where we are now, though only after
what one might expect to be rather lengthy litigation necessitating
a Supreme Court determination.73
It is to be hoped, however, that if such a determination is
reached, it will only be after searching analysis of the present law.
The requirement that there be complete diversity is not necessarily
derived from the Constitution; rather, it resulted from a Supreme
Court constuction of the First Judiciary Act.7" The Court's decision,
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 75 did not so much as mention the Constitution,
but after quoting the statute held:
The court understands these expressions to mean, that each distinct interest
should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be
sued, in the federal courts. That is, that where the interest is joint, each of
the persons concerned in that interest must be competent to sue, or liable to be
sued, in those courts.7 6
That Strawbridge does not constitute constitutional doctrine is
strengthened by the fact that the interpleader statute77 has been held
7.2 The plaintiff carrying his judgment to a sister federal court or a state court may be
attacked on the basis that the jurisdiction of the original court did not extend to him.
Conceivably, the second court could deny execution or enforcement of a judgment as to
a (b) (3) class member unless he could show citizenship diverse to all class-opposing
parties.
73 Besides diversity, the question of jurisdictional amount becomes important in those
class actions where claims of individual members are insufficient to satisfy this require-
ment. The general practice under the old rule was to aggregate the claims of the class
members for purposes of determining jurisdiction only in a "true" class action; in a
"hybrid" or "spurious" action each class member was required independently to allege
a sufficient claim to commence an action or to intervene. 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 569,
at 321-22. The factor determining the permissibility of aggregation was whether the
rights asserted were "joint" or "several." See generally Cohn, Problems in Establishing
Federal Jurisdiction Ov~er an Unincorporated Labor Union, 47 GEo. L.J. 491, 525 (1959).
The repudiation of these classifications and the extension of the judgment to all members
of the class regardless of their presence in court undermines the traditional basis for
the aggregation distinction. This could possibly lead to the aggregation of the claims
of members of all types of classes, or at least all those otherwise properly before the
court, for purposes of commencing the action. Hess v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 20
F.R.D. 466, 477-78 (S.D. Cal. 1957). However, if the judgment includes all members
of the class, the problem of meeting the jurisdictional amount in order to intervene
would be largely bypassed.
74 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
75 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
76 Ibid.
77 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964).
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constitutional, 8 though it rests on minimal diversity-only one party
on each side of the actual controversy must have citizenship different
from that of at least one party on the other side. Moreover, the
entire concept of ancillary jurisdiction makes serious inroads on a
complete diversity requirement. Indeed, the true and, hybrid class
actions of old rule 23 (a) (1) and (a) (2) constituted exceptions to
the requirement,79 Thus, where the concept of complete diversity
has conflicted with other considerations, it has given way. And at
least in the case of ancillary jurisdiction, statutory change was not
required. There appears to be little reason why the Strawbridge
restriction should not be cut back further at this time so far as the
new 23 (b) (2) and (b) (3) class actions are concerned.80
Venue should pose no difficulties under the new rule.81  As venue
is a defense personal to the party who could claim that he is being
sued in an improper district, it is of course not available to a plain-
tiff.82 Should a representative of a defendant class raise venue as a
defense, he could be dropped, and the class action could continue as
such so long as there remained adequate representation by members
who could not or would not object to venue. Nonparty members of a
23(b) (3) class who chose to appear would be waiving any venue
defense. A problem might arise as to an absent member of a 23 (b)
(3) class who did not appear but also did not choose to exclude
78 Although the Supreme Court has never directly passed on this question, it has
entertained an interpleader action in precisely these circumstances. Dugas v. American
Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 4-14, 425 (1937), affirming 82 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1936). The constitu-
tionality of the statute has been upheld by the lower courts. Haynes v. Felder, 239
F.2d 868, 875-76 (5th Cir. 1957); see Cramer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 F.2d
141, 14647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 739 (1937); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
§ 74, at 280-81 (1963) ; Ilsen & Sardell, Interpleader in the Federal Courtt, 35 ST.
JoHN's L. Rav. 1, 14-24- (1960); Note, 63 HAv. L. REV. 861, 866 (1950).
79 For a discussion of ancillary jurisdiction see generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
§ 9 (1963).
80 It has been argued that Strawbridge should be overruled. Note, 75 YALE L.J.
138, 144 (1965) ; Multiparty Litigation 994.
[T]he compelling rationale underlying the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction
today does not seem to be limited to protection from local prejudice. Historical
interpretations based on local prejudice alone should not preclude the federal courts
from fulfilling their important function in multiparty litigation as far as the
constitutional grant allows.
Id. at 995.
81 Venue is another subject expressly excluded from the scope of the rules. FED. R.
Civ. P. 82.
82 See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 42 (1963).
1966] CIVIL PROCEDURE 1223
himself. Here the policy of the rule would be best served by con-
struing his failure to exclude himself as consent to venue.
The change in spurious class actions from the old to new rules is
most significant. The mere fact that an absent member must now
take the initiative to exclude himself, rather than being excluded
unless he opts into the litigation, will result in a much greater range
of effectiveness for class actions. It should be noted that under the
new rule there is no power to force an absent member in a (b) (3)
class to be included; a proposal of the Advisory Committee that the
request of an absent member to exclude himself could be rejected by
the court if his "inclusion is essential to the fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of the controversy" was deleted in the final version of the
amendment.88
In giving the absent member an express right to enter an appear-
ance, the rule raises some interesting problems. Heretofore one en-
tered an appearance only if he were a party to the action ;84 on entering
an appearance, he assumed all of the rights of a party. Does the right
given to an absent member to enter an appearance mean that he will
have the rights of a party for all purposes, including the right to pre-
sent witnesses, cross-examine, and argue? If so, a class action could
become quite unwieldy. Section (d), however, gives the court the
express power to issue appropriate orders to control the conduct of
the proceedings so as to prevent "undue repetition or complication in
88 This deletion was related to another deleted provision which empowered the courts
to require that an ordinary action become a class action. Preliminary Draft 386. While
in many cases it is advantageous to litigate as a class, the power to compel such
litigation would be significantly diluted if all those who would thus be affected could
arbitrarily exclude themselves. These provisions experienced favorable and adverse
criticism. See Comm. on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference-Ninth
Circuit, Supplemental Report, 37 F.R.D. 71, 82, 84, 91 (1965) ; Note, 51 VA. L. Rav. 629,
651-54 (1965). The Virginia Note contended that the exclusion provisions and the
power to alter orders at any time afforded the class members adequate protection..
In the absence of a power to compel inclusion, self-exclusion by a sufficient number
of class members could result in the action being stripped of its class character. But
this should not affect the rights of the nonclass plaintiff to proceed against named
defendants or of named plaintiffs to carry on against the defendant along with those who
wished to intervene. In any such action, members who excluded themselves from the
original class should not be found to be "indispensible" if only "common questions," and
not (b) (1) or (b) (2) criteria, bind them to the remaining parties. See discussion of
new rule 19 at pp. 1204-11 supra.
84 5 AM. JUL- 2d Appearance § 1 (1962) ; 6 C.J.S. Appearances § 1 (1937); BLACe,
LAW DIerMOMARY 125 (4th ed. 1951). But see 6 C.J.S. Appearances § 4 (1937).
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the presentation of evidence or argument"-a power heretofore in-
herently possessed by the court. This power of course could not be
exercised in contravention of the members' rights. 5 The significance
of permitting an appearance by a rule 23 (b) (3) class member is to
bestow on him as a practical matter the automatic right to be a party
subject to any limitations the court may in its discretion impose. He
need not even so much as file a motion to intervene as of right under
rule 24(a).
It should be noted that this right to appear applies only to (b) (3)
actions and not to those brought under (b) (1) and (b) (2). The
rule contemplates intervention by members of those classes only at the
discretion of the district court, apparently on the theory that greater
shared interests between the representatives and absent members of
(b) (1) and (b) (2) classes will more readily safeguard the rights of
absent members than in (b) (3) actions. Rule 23 (d) (2) gives the
court the power to invite such intervention in (b) (1) and (b) (2)
actions, but a request for intervention as of right may be initiated by
the absent member under rule 24(a) (2) only if he can show that his
interests may as a practical matter be impeded or impaired and that
he is not adequately represented.86 Absent the court's inviting class
members to come forward and object to jurisdiction, a motion to in-
tervene of right may constitute the most direct means for a (b) (1) or
(b) (2) class member to object to the action's class status.87
85 However, should it develop that the class-representing attorney who is empowered
to present evidence and argument does not adequately and fairly protect the interests
of a member whose participation in the conduct of the trial is limited by court order,
this may indicate that the member does not share a community of interest with the
representative in control of the litigation and is therefore not a part of the same class.
A division into subclasses authorized by subdivision (c) (4) may then be appropriate.
Should the member's complaint be only as to trial tactics and not rise to the dignity
of lack of protection of his rights, the district court's control over the proceedings
should govern.
86 The amended rule should have little effect on present practice regarding meeting
the statute of limitations by intervenors. In order to share in a spurious class action
judgment, a nonparty class member had to intervene; but whether he had to meet
the statute of limitations in doing so was a disputed question. 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF
§ 568, at 315-16. If the new rule operates as intended, binding absent class members,
the problem will largely be bypassed since the need for intervening to share in the
judgment will no longer exist. And, if the court accepts the theory that one who will
be -bound by the judgment should be permitted to intervene notwithstanding the running
of the statute of limitations, the statute should be no bar to intervention for any other
purpose.
87 If the class action will as a practical matter affect the movant's rights, the question
1224
1966] CIVIL PROCEDURE 1225
The new rule eliminates the unfairness of what the Advisory Com-
mittee terms one-way intervention by a spurious class member, who,
under the old rule, could remain uncommitted until the termination of
the litigation. Then, if the outcome were favorable to the class, many
courts permitted the judgment to remain open for a period of time
to allow absent members to intervene and take advantage of it.
Should the outcome be unfavorable to the class, absent members were
not bound and could commence subsequent actions since they were not
parties to the original action. Under the new rule, however, it is con-
templated that the judgment will bind all members of a (b) (3) class
who do not request exclusion. Since the court is to set a time limit for
this request, it is clearly contemplated that a class member who does
not opt out early in the litigation will be bound no matter what the
outcome of the suit."8
The rule requires that a judgment in a (b) (1) or (b) (2) action
shall "include and describe those whom the court finds to be members
of the class." In a (b) (3) action the court is to "include and specify
or describe those to whom the notice . . . was directed, and who
have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members
of the class." The requirement as to (b) (3) may prove somewhat
of adequacy of representation will be put squarely in issue. If the class action will
not affect the movant's interests, a denial of the motion could serve to assure the
movant that the court's definition of the class will not encompass him. Thus, a
potential class member is guaranteed court consideration of his position. One writer
has suggested that the combined effect of rules 23 and 24 is to impose an obligation to
intervene on a class member who thinks he is not being adequately represented. Stopher,
Proposed Changes in the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts,
31 INS. COUNSEL J. 681, 686 (1964).
88 That the one-way effect of the present rule is to be eliminated raises an interesting
problem where mutuality is no longer a prerequisite to collateral estoppel. The doctrine
of mutuality requires that, in order to take advantage of collateral estoppel, the
plaintiff must show he would have been bound by an adverse judgment in the prior
case. See generally Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments,
35 TuL. L. Ray. 301 (1961). In at least one jurisdiction this requirement has been
eliminated. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811-13, 122 P.2d 892, 894-95
(1942). See generally Note, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 652 n.69 (1965). If the court applies
collateral estoppel without the mutuality requirement, a member of a (b) (3) class who
chooses to be excluded from the action may in a subsequent action still take advantage
of a judgment favorable to the class, although he would not be bound in any way if
the class judgment were unfavorable. Thus the desire to permit one to benefit from a
judgment only if he would also be subject to that judgment will at least in part be
frustrated. The proposal empowering the court to deny a (b) (3) class member's
exclusion could have eliminated this contingency. See ibid.
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troublesome. It expressly requires that the court list the name of each
person to whom notice was sent unless he properly excluded himself.
Also, the court must abstractly describe a group of any unknown per-
sons as to whom two requirements have been satisfied: first, the "best
notice practicable under the circumstances" was directed to them, and
second, they fall within the court's definition of the class. But more
than this obvious requirement may be required in some cases to reach
a definition of the group intended to be covered, for if some who ex-
cluded themselves are embraced by the abstract definition of the class,
the court will have to list them expressly as excluded from the class
included in the judgment.
Derivative Suits and Unincorporated
Association Actions
Derivative actions by shareholders were treated with class actions
under section (b) of the old rule. It has been argued that the
shareholder's derivative action has little in common with a real class
action and therefore deserved separate treatment.80 New rule 23.1
affords this separate treatment,90 while retaining the elements of a
derivative action with little change.9'
It is clear that some proper derivative suits could not meet the pre-
requisites for a class action, 2 and indeed derivative suits were not
89 Note, Shareholder Derivative Suits: Are They Class Actions?, 42 IowA L. Rnv. 568
(1957). This article was sharply criticized. LOUISELL & HAZARD, CASES ON PLEADING
AND PROCEDURE 721 (1962). Professor Wright called the article "heretical and unhis-
torical." WPiGirr, FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 268 n.15 (1963).
90 The Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit disapproved this treatment. Comm. on
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference-Ninth Circuit, Supplemental Re-
port, 37 F.R.D. 71, 71-72 (1965).
91 New rule 23.1 specifies in part:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce
a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or
association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it,
the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a share-
holder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his
share devolved on him by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a
collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would
not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts,
if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors
or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and
the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.
92An example of this is a case in which the plaintiff owns all the stock. See gen-
erally 42 IowA L. REv. 568, 570-72 (1957).
subject to the requirements of old 23 (a).93 Although separation is
desirable, certain of the, procedural safeguards attaching to a class
action must be carried over. The amended rule provides: "The
derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff
does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the share-
holders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the
corporation or association." Apparently recognizing that it was fre-
quently minority interests which were being represented, the Advisory
Committee adopted the above in lieu 'of the parallel provision in the
preliminary draft: "The derivative action may be maintained only if
the court is satisfied that the plaintiff will adequately represent the
interest of the corporation or association."
Substantially the same protection accorded' class members with
respect to dismissal or compromise is given to the shareholders or
members by the new rule: "The action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in
such manner as the court directs." 94 However, a provision in the pre-
liminary draft incorporating section 23 (d) on orders in conduct of
actions, was not 'included in the final 23.1 proposal. Presumably the
rationale for this is that the orders suggested for class actions are not
particularly adapted to derivative suits, and the courts inherently
possess the power to issue similar orders.95
In the Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 23.2 it is pointed out
that actions by and against unincorporated associations have been
considered class actions primarily to accord them "entity treatment."
The common elements in the two have led the Advisory Committee to
incorporate by reference the order provisions of 23 (d) and the dis-
missal and compromise protections of 23 (e). It would seem that
neither 23.1 nor 23.2 contain anything that could be construed to ex-
pand or otherwise significantly alter these actions,96' since the additions
are primarily aimed at eliminating the anomalies of the old rule while
insuring that procedural safeguards will be retained.
93 2 BARR N & HOLTZOFF § 561, at 257.
94The changes in 23(e) and 23.1 from the Preliminary Draft to the final proposals
made these dismissal and compromise sections essentially the same. It seems that the
provisions of 23(e) could have been incorporated into 23.1 by reference as was done
in 23.2.
9 See 51 VA. L. Rav. 629 (1965).
9 0 Although separated from other class actions, new rulk 23.2 applies only to class
1966], CIVIL PROCEDURE 1227i
1228 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54: p. 1204
Reactions to the Rule 23 Scheme
In his dissent to the transmittal of the amendments, Mr. Justice
Black indicated his particular dissatisfaction with rule 23.
It seems to me that they [amendments to rule 23] place too much power in the
hands of the trial judges and that the rules might almost as well provide that
'class suits can be maintained either for or against particular groups when-
ever in the discretion of a judge he thinks it wise.' The power given to the judge
to dismiss such suits or to divide them into groups at will subjects members of
classes to dangers that could not follow from carefully prescribed legal stan-
dards enacted to control class suits.
And the Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit attacked the pro-
posed revision on the ground that it "repudiates the historic opinion
that the legal system operates on an individualized and personal
basis. ' 17 The weight of authority to the contrary has urged these
amendments.
That the amended rule introduces more certainty into this area is
obvious. But its practical effects-largely dependent on the application
of the rule by the district judges-remain to be seen. 8 The attention
and comment directed to this rule and its obvious flexibility should
serve as a caution to the bench to consider carefully all the factors and
interests involved when confronted with a class action. s9
actions brought against the unincorporated association "by naming members as repre-
sentative parties." Actions by or against unincorporated associations are considered
true class actions, thus obviating the complete diversity requirement. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTs § 72, at 269-70 (1963). The class method of suing unincorporated associations
has been criticized. Note, 75 YALE L.J. 138, 143-44 (1965). But the preservation of this
remedy is necessary, since when other than federal questions are involved (in which
case rule 17(b) (1) may apply), the unincorporated association may not sue or be
sued in federal courts unless the citizenship of all its members is diverse from that of
the opposing party. United Steelworkers v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
Indicating a desire to see jurisdiction expanded in this area, the Supreme Court has
assigned the responsibility for making any changes in this diversity requirement to
Congregs. Id. at 153.
97 Comm. on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference-Ninth Circuit,
Supplemental Report, 37 F.R.D. 71, 76-77 (1965).
98 It has been suggested that the amended rules 23, 23.1, and 23.2 be adopted "on a
frankly experimental basis." Letter From John R. McDonough to J. E. Simpson, March
8, 1965, in id. at 91. Although this was not done, future adjustment can be anticipated if
abuses develop.
99 The success or failure of the broad, new rule depends on the courts. "Practical
procedural effects rather than the abstract substantive right ought to govern. A satis-
factory rule can only lay down broad guidelines for the courts and bar, depending upon
the tradition and good sense of our judges to prevent abuse." Weinstein, supra note
55, at 470.
INTERVENTION-RULE 24 (a)
The changes to rule 24, providing for intervention of nonparties,
illustrate once again that the focus of the current amendments is on
the abandonment of formal, legalistic restrictions and the utilization
of pragmatic solutions that guarantee fairness and orderly procedure.
The amended rule retains the dichotomy between intervention as of
right (rule 24(a)) and permissive intervention (rule 24(b)), but
extensive changes are made in section (a). The old rule set forth three
situations in which intervention was of right. The first, where a sta-
tute provides for intervention as of right, is unchanged. The second
and third, however, have been completely rewritten.
Old rule 24(a) (2) gave a party an absolute right to intervene
"when the representation of the applicant's interests is or may be in-
adequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the
action." Thus the rule, applicable mainly to class actions, required a
showing of two elements-inadequate representation and the possi-
bility that the applicant will be bound. As a practical matter the
courts usually passed over the question of adequate representation to
consider first whether a party "is or may be bound."' 00 The crucial
question then arose as to the meaning that should be given to the word
"bound." Although many cases adopted a more liberal view,' 0' the
weight of authority construed the term in its strict res judicata sense. 0 2
Thus a party was required to show that he would be legally bound by
the judgment. It was not enough to show that, as a practical matter,
his interests would be materially prejudiced by an adverse judgment in
the present action.0 3
100 1 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 425 (2d ed. 1947) ; Note, Intervention and the Meaning
of "Bound" under Federal Rule 24(a) (2), 63 YALE L.J. 408, 410 n.14 (1954).
101 E.g., Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Mack v. Passaic Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 150 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1945); Tatum v. Cardillo, 11 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y.
1951); United States v. C. M. Cane Life Boat Co., 25 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1938),
aff'd on other grounds, 118 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed, 314 U.S. 579 (1941).
102 E.g., Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961); Sutphen
Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951); Formlabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co.,
275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960); Cameron v. President and
Fellows of Harvard College, 157 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1946). See generally Note, Inter-
vJention of Private Parties Under Federal Rule 24, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 922 (1952); Note,
63 YALE L.J. 408 (1954).
103 See, e.g., Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137
(1944); Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 374 (W.D. Ark. 1953). However, it has been
persuasively argued that this interpretation of "bound" was not intended by the original
draftsmen. Comment, Intervuention of Right in Class Acltions: The Dilemma of Federal
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The immediate motivation for the change in the rule was the Su-
preme Court's decision in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States."0 4
There the 'Court noted that an earlier decision, Hansberry v. Lee, 05
had hed ,that due process would not permit a member of a class who
was inadequately represented from being bound by a judgment to
which he was not a party.106 In short, the Court pointed out in Sam
Fox that the two elements required by 24(a) (2) could never coexist
and,thus the section was a nullity in class actions. 10 7
Old rule 24(a) (3) granted a right to intervene "when the appli-
cant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of propertywhich is in the custody or subject to the control
o;r disposition of the court or an officer thereof." The practice among
th~e courts prior to the drafting of the original rule was to allow inter-
vention if the court, :was in possession of any type of property that
could be loosely termed a "fund."' 08 The liberality of this approach
was not changed by the seemingly stricter language of the original rule
Rule, of Civil Procedure, 24(a) (2), 50 CALIF. L. REV. 89, 92-100 (1962). The author
contends that it was the intention of the draftsmen to codify existing federal practice
and that the res judicata interpretation of "bound" represents a departure from the
traditional tests for intervention as of right. Cf. 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 24,03",04,
at 9-23 (2d ed. 1963). The term should be interpreted to allow intervention as of right
by any person who stands to gain or lose by operation of the judgment. 2 BARRO14 &
HoLTzos § 597, at 381; 7 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.17, at 21-22 (3d ed.
1951) ; Bergeri Intervention by PublicAgencies in Private Litigation in the Federal Courts,
50 YALE L.J. 65 n.4 (1940).
104 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
105 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
106 "Although the Hansberry case deals only with a class action, [Fox] . . . seems
to apply [the Hansberry] . . . principle to all suits involving representation of absent
interests." Comment, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 89, 91 n.13 (1962).
107"[A]ppellants face this dilemma: the judgment in a class action will bind
only those members of the class whose interests have been adequately represented by
existing parties to the litigation . . . yet intervention as of right presupposes that an
intervenor's interests are or may not be so represented." 366 U.S. at 691.
08 ,Writing in 1936 Moore and Levi stated:
If a trust cannot be shown, a favorite device to support intervention is the fund
theory. Here the emphasis shifts to a determination of whether the court is in
possession of property, or something less than property. The concept of a fund
has been applied so loosely that it is possible for a court to find a fund in almost
any in personam action.
Moore & Levi, Federal Intervention, 45 YALE L.J. 565, 589-90 (1936). It is interesting
to note that the above quoted sentences appear unchanged in 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACriCE
24.09, at 55 (2d ed. 1963).
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and the 1946 amendments.'0 0 The Advisory Committee notes, that
"some decided cases virtually disregarded the language of this pro-
vision."' The reason for the strained reading of the rule was the
reluctance of many courts to change the more permissive practice that
existed prior to the drafting-of the federal rules. This reluctance was
understandable in view of the stated purpose of the draftsmen and
the Supreme Court that rule 24(a) was to be a codification of inter-
vention practice then existing."'
The current amendments to rule 24 substitute one subsection for
former subsections (a) (2) and (a) (3). It now allows, intervention
of right
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that ihe disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing-
parties."12
The new rule seems to have solved the res judicata problem under the
old rule while retaining the'requirement of inadequate representa-
tion."- It appears to be more in line with the practice prior to the
federal rules and with the original intent of the draftsmen and the
court to codify and amplify that practice.
109 "The 1946 amendment to Rule 24(a)(3) clarified the'question of court 'control.
Under the amendment property need not be' actually in the custddy. of the court or an
officer thereof if it is 'subject to the control or disposition' of the court." 4 id. 24.09, at
58.
110 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 24(a).
111The original Advisory Committee's Note states that the rule "amplifies and. re-
stat~s the present federal practice at law and in equity." AbvisoRY COMMITrEE ON CIIL
RuLEs, NoTEs 25 (March 1938). The Supreme Court has said that rule 24(a) was
meant to be a "codification of general doctrines of intervention." Missouri-Kansas Pipe
Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 508 (1941).
112 New rule 24(a).
113The requirement that an applicant show that existing parties do not adequately
represent his interest now applies to all intervention situations which formerly came
under rule 24(a) (2) and (3). One result of the change is that those parties who before
the change could have intervened under rule 24(a) (3) will now have to show in-
adequate representation as an additional element. However this effect is not believed
to be significant since almost any applicant under old rule 24(a) (3) presumably could
have shown inadequate representation. "The most decisive way of proving inadequacy
of representation obviously is to show' that petitioner's interests are not represented at
all." Note, Intervention of Private Parties Under Federal Rule 24, 52 COLUM. L. REV.
922, 924-25 (1952).
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The present Advisory Committee recognized that the wording of
old rule 24 (a) (3) "was unduly restrictive." The principle underlying
the deletion of subsection (a) (3) was that "if an absentee would be
substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination made
in an action, he should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene and
his right to do so should not depend on whether there is a fund to be
distributed or otherwise disposed of."' '
The obvious overall effect of the changes is to liberalize the right
to intervene in federal civil actions. It is interesting to note that the
early draft of the committee's proposals allowed intervention when the
disposition of the action would "as a practical matter substantially
impair or impede" the applicant's protection of his interest." 5 The
final draft deleted the word "substantially." Although nowhere ex-
plained, the omission apparently stems from a fear that the courts
would distort the intended meaning of the rule by placing too much
stress on substantiality and thereby deny intervention in some meri-
torious cases. 1
In the usual intervention question, there are three interests to be
considered-the protection of the nonparties, trial convenience, and
the protection of the original parties. The concept of intervention as
of right carries with it an implicit judgment that justice demands that
the first interest should predominate over the other two.11 7 Some
commentators have predicted that the present liberalization of rule 24
would upset this balance and result in injustice to the original parties
and needless confusion in the courts through the interjection of col-
lateral issues.118 It remains to be seen to what extent this is an idle
fear. The Advisory Committee with this problem in mind adds to the
end of their note "an intervention of right under the amended rule
may be subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions responsive
among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the
proceedings.""'0
114 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 24(a).
115 Preliminary Draft 396. (Emphasis added.)
116 The same alteration has been noted in connection with rule 19(a) (2). See text
accompanying note 20 supra.
117 Berger, Intervention by Public Agencies in Private Litigation in the Federal
Courts, 50 YALE L.J. 65 (1940). For certain class actions this interest so predominates
that not even a motion for intervention as of right is required. An appearance is auto-
matically permitted under amended rule 23 (c) (2) (C).
118"Any rule superficially more liberal will only prove illiberal in its effect upon
federal procedure and the rights of original parties." Note, 63 YALE L.J. 408, 417 (1954).
119 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 24(a).
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PLEADINGS
WAIVER OF DILATORY DEFENSES-
RULE 12 (g) AND (h)
Divergent interpretations of the provision-"A party waives all de-
fenses and objections which he does not present either by motion as
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer"'
20
-were the impetus for the amendment of rules 12 (g) and (h). The
division arose with respect to pleadings in which an available dilatory
defense was omitted from a preanswer motion. Could this defense be
included in the answer although it was not permissible in another mo-
tion? Cases following Phillips v. Baker' 21 answered in the affirma-
tive. 22
In Phillips, the defendants first moved for a more definite statement
and then in their answer asserted the defense of improper venue, to
which the plaintiffs claimed waiver since the defense was not included
in the prior motion. The court of appeals, hypothesizing that if this
were a waiver, "subdivision (h) would be given a narrow, rigid, and
illiberal construction, which frequently would result in injustice,' 23
went on to say: "Evidently, the paragraph was intended to provide
that any defense permitted to be made by motion at the option of the
defendant, and which is not raised either by motion or- by the answer,
will be deemed to have been waived."'
The Phillips decision was criticized in Keefe v. Derounian,125 the
leading case in support of waiver.126 There, the defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and, in the
alternative, to strike a paragraph. He then attempted to raise in his
120 FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (h).
121 121 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 688 (1941).
122 E.g., Crum v. Graham, 32 F.R.D. 173 (D. Mont. 1963) (following Phillips solely
on basis of stare decisis) ; Birnbaum v. Birrell, 9 F.R.D. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
123 121 F.2d at 755.
124 Ibid.
125 6 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1946). The court indicated that the effect of the Phillips
case would be to burden the plaintiff unduly, and it would "inject a different type of
formalism into the rules-by allowing dilatory matter, which can no longer be raised by
motion because it was not joined with the first motion, to be made by another type of
pleading called the answer." Id. at 14.
126 See, e.g., Elbinger v. Precision Metal Workers Corp., 18 F.R.D. 467 (E.D. Wis.
1956); P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. Duke Labs., Inc., 10 F.R.D. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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answer an objection to service of process. The court, holding that he
had waived this defense, reasoned that:
In order to prevent the waste of time resulting from the filing of successive
motions, subdivision (g) requires the consolidation of motions . . . . It hardly
seems reasonable first to deny that a defendant can raise this dilatory defense
at this stage by one type of pleading called a motion, and then allow him to
raise it by another type Called the answer. To lay such emphasis on formalism
seems contrary to the purpose for which the Rules of Civil Procedure were
adopted. 1 2
7
To establish conclusively and clearly the correct Keefe interpreta.
tion, 2 8 rule 12 (h) has been rewritten to specify that the dilatory de.
fenses of (1) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (2) improper venue,
(3) insufficiency of process, and (4) insufficiency of service of process
are unequivocally waived if they are omitted from a preanswer motion.
Rule 12 (g) was changed solely to remain consistent with 12 (h).
The changes in the rules will remedy the present discord and should
not create any future problems in this regard. One point deserves
comment however. It has been suggested that the phrase in subsection
(h) (1)-"to be made as a matter of course"-should be deleted.120
It would be anomalous to do so since that would contradict the goal of
rules 12 (g) and (h) to obviate unnecessary delay and expense during
a trial. Rule 15(a) permits two types of amendments to pleadings:
(1) those "as a matter of course," and (2) those with the consent of
opposing counsel or by leave of court. Should the phrase be omitted,
the listed dilatory defenses could be raised at any time that an amended
pleading is consented to or permitted, and this may be during or at the
end of the trial. The better rule is to prohibit raising such dilatory
matters except at the opening stage of the litigation.
One other matter may cause some difficulties. The amended rule as
finally adopted uses the term "indispensable under rule 19." As previ-
127 6 F.R.D. at 13.
128 The cases which have followed this view [Keefe] seem to represent a sound and
proper interpretation -of the rule. Thus where a party has made a Rule 12 motion,
he should not be permitted, either by subsequent motion or in his answer, to raise
any defense or objection which could have been raised in the original motion.
1A BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 370, at 525. "This result [Keefe interpretation] is supported
both by the literal language of Rule 12(h) and by the desirability of requiring all
dilatory matters to be asserted in advance if a preliminary motion is made." WRIaH,
FEDERAL COURTS § 66, at 244 (1963) ; see 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTrca 12.23, at 2327-28
(2d ed. 1964).
129 SUBCOMMIrTE ON THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, FEDERAL BAR Ass'N, REPORT ON
THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 3 (1964).
1234
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ously discussed,80 "indispensable" has been given a different meaning
in the amended rules than it has had heretofore. The use of this term
may therefore provide a pitfall for the unwary who might carelessly
rely on its old and now discarded meaning.
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES AND RELATION BACK-
RULE 15 (c)
Old rule 15 (c) provided that an amendment to a pleading related
'back to the date of the original pleading "whenever the claim or de-
fense [it] asserted . . . arose out of the conduct, transaction, or oc-
currence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original... .The rule was chiefly important in furthering the federal rules' policy
of deciding cases on the merits. 31 Where the amendment merely
clarified or altered the cause of action or the theory of the case, or
stated a different claim arising out of the same cause of action, rela-
tion back was uniformly allowed. 2 But serious problems resulted in
those instances in which the complaint named the wrong defendant
and the statute of limitations expired prior to an amendment correcting
the error. Where the newly named defendant was in no way -con-
nected with the previously named defendant and 'had no notice that he
was in fact being sued, prohibiting a relation back that would fall
within the limitations period was a proper result.'88 But where the
newly named defendant received notice of the action and knew or
should have known that he was the intended defendant, the same result
seemed unjust. This was particularly true when the suit was against
the United States or an officer or agency thereof.8
180 See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
181 It is axiomatic that this is a central aim of the federal rules, and that rule
15(c) helps to foster it. See, e.g., Copeland Motors Co. v. General Motors Corp., 199
F.2d 566, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Brown v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 189 F.2d
871, 874-75 (2d Cir. 1951) ; WRiGHT, FEDERAL CouRis § 66, at 240 (1963).
182 E.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line, R.R., 323 U.S. 574 (1945) ; New, York Cent. &
H.R.R.R. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340 (1922); Green v. Walsh, 21 F.R.D. 15 (D. Wis.
1957); see Developments in the Law,-Statute of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177;
124142 (1950). The purpose of relation back is to preserve the "invulnerability of the
claim" created by the original pleading. 1A BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 448, at 757.
188 See ibid.
134 Nevertheless most cases refused to allow relation back. E.g.,, Cohn v. Federal
Security Administration, 199 F. Supp. 884, 885 (W.D.N.Y. 1961)'; Hall v. HEW, 199 F.
Supp. 833 (S.D. Tex. 1960); Sandridge v. Folsom, 200 F. Supp. 25 (M.D. Tenn. 1959) ;
Cunningham v. United States 199 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Jacobson v. United
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Illustrative are four cases which involved suits under Section 205(g) of the Social Security ActO35 and which held sub silentio that such
amendments did not relate back because they failed to meet the 15 (c)
same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" requirement.180 In each
case, instead of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, the
plaintiffs timely, but mistakenly, named as defendant either a non-
existent agency, 187 the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, 138 a Secretary who had retired from office nineteen days be-
fore,89 or the United States. 40 The courts, in denying leave to amend,
relied on either Davis v. L. L. Cohen & Co. 4' or Mellon v. Arkansas
Land & Lumber Co.,' both of which were decided before the adop-
tion of the federal rules. They reasoned that to change the name of
the defendant to the Secretary would be to commence a new proceed-
ing, a situation in which relation back is not permitted. 48 These
courts ignored the fact that the ultimate defendant, the United
States, 14' was put on notice of the claims in each case, and that the
policy of the limitation period was not offended. 45
States, 160 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Lomax v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 354
(E.D. Pa. 1957); Figle v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mont. 1957).
13553 Stat. 1370 (1939), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1964). In order to have
review under the act, the plaintiff had to file suit against the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare within sixty days after he received notice of the latter's
decision.
136Not one of the opinions indicated whether rule 15(c) had been considered in
deciding the cases.
187 Cohn v. Federal Security Administration, 199 F. Supp. 884 (W.D.N.Y. 1961).
138 Hall v. HEW, 199 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
139 Sandridge v. Folsom, 200 F. Supp. 25 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
140 Cunningham v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
141268 U.S. 639 (1925).
142 275 U.S. 460 (1928). As mentioned previously, note 136 supra, there was no
indication that rule 15(c) was given consideration. It has been suggested that, since
these cases had never been questioned by the Supreme Court, the district courts were
"reluctant to try to second-guess the . . . Court" and were content to "travel the
quick, easy, and safe route of stare decisis." Byse, Suing the "Wrong" Defendant in
Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Proposals For Reform, 77 HAI.V.
L. REv. 40, 52 (1963).
143 See Cohn v. Federal Security Administration, 199 F. Supp. 884, 885 (W.D.N.Y.
1961).
144See Zeller v. Folsom, 150 F. Supp. 615, 617 (N.D.N.Y. 1956), where, in a § 205(g)
suit, the court said: "No authority is necessary to support the statement that this action
is in effect an action against the government .. ."
145 The new claim, naming the Secretary, clearly arose out of the same "conduct,
transaction, or occurrence" set out in the original pleading. Since these cases, the Social
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The amended rule provides that an amendment changing a party
against whom a claim is asserted relates back when, in addition to
meeting the other requirements of rule 15 (c), the "new" party "within
the period provided by law for commencing the action against him,"
(1) received such notice as to preclude his being "prejudiced in main-
taining his defense of the merits, and (2) knew or should have known
that" he would have been the namedparty but for a mistake concern-
ing his identity.146 The rule further provides that the rbquirements of
"notice" and "knowledge" are satisfied "with respect to the United
States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action ai
a defendant" if process is delivered or mailed to either "the United
States Attorney, or his designee, or the Attorney General of the
United States, or any agency or officer who would have been a proper
defendant if named.)1 47
By codifying the heretofore implied policy behind the rule, the revi-
sion seems to accomplish its purpose and is consistent with the recogni-
tion of the United States as the true defendant in suits against federal
agencies or officers. Moreover, in the government cases, the rule will
further advance the objectives of the 1961 amendment of rule 25(d) .148
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST-RULE 17 (a)
Removal of certain restrictions on substitution of plaintiffs is ac-
complished by an amendment that adds an additional sentence to rule
17(a):
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or sub-
Security Administration has amended § 404.954 of its regulations to provide that if,
instead of the Secretary, suit is brought against "the United States or any agency,
officer, or employee thereof," the complainant will be notified of his mistake, and the
sixty-day limit shall be extended to run from the day "following the date of mailing
of such notice." 20 C.F.R. § 404.954 (1965). But this does not solve the problem in
the case of private parties or other agencies of the government.
146 This approach is supported by some prior cases. E.g., Taylor v. Reading Co., 23
F.R.D. 186 (E.D. Pa. 1958) ; Green v. Walsh, 21 F.R.D. 15 (E.D. Wis. 1957).
147 The relation back of amendments changing plaintiffs is not expressly mentioned in
new rule 15(c). But, since the problem is generally easier, the Advisory Committee's
Note indicates that the rule extends to such amendments by analogy.
148 FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d) provides for automatic substitution of the successor public
officer.
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stitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or sub-
stitutio nshall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the
-name of the real party in interest.
As the Advisory. Committee points out, the purpose of rule 17 (a) as
originally promulgated was to permit the real party in interest to bring
a suit. 'That'having been accomplished, the modern function of the
rule in its negfitive aspect is simply to protect the defendant against a
subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to in-
sure generally that the judgment will have its proper effect as res
judicata."' 4 But in this aspect, the rule can be used to deny justice as
well, for a legitimate mistake can be made as to who is the real party
in interest.5 0 In such a case it would be unjust to dismiss the suit,
particularly where the statute of limitations would prevent the institu-
tion of a new suit. The amendment would prevent such an injustice by
providing a relation back of the joinder or substitution of the real
party in interest.'51
The Advisory Committee's Note makes it clear that this provision
is to be limited to those instances where an honest mistake has been
made in choosing the name in which the original action was filed.' 52 It
is unfortunate that the rule itself does not contain some limiting lan-
guage, for as written the bare language appears to give the district
court no alternaive but to permit a relation back. One can almost be
sure that some courts will apply the rule literally, arguing that since
there is no ambiguity, there is no reason to go behind the rule to its
"legislative" history for a clarification. Such a result would of course
violate the purpose of the rule and should be avoided if possible."a
149 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 17(a).
150 This change was suggested because of the unification of the civil and admiralty
procedure. "Such provision is thought necessary because in some maritime situations,
the person entitled to sue cannot be readily determined and the statute of limitations is
short." 2 BARRON & HOLTZoFF (Supp. 1965, at 9). But its impact is not limited to
admiralty cases.
151 The Advisory Committee remarked that the change, in its impact on the general
civil practice, is designed to keep "pace with' the law as it is actually developing."
Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 17 (a).
152 Ibid.
153Two additional changes are made in rule 17(a). One, the elimination of a
"but," is designed to indicate that the fiduciaries listed are not exceptions to the rule
that a suit is to be broughtby the real party in interest. Rather the fiduciaries listed
are only illustrations of the rule. Ibid.; see 2 BARRON & HOLTZoF § 482, at 8-9;
Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Rule: A Plea for its .4bolition, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rav.
926, 958 (1957).
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TRIALS
There are four chafiges made in 'the rules that will' aiect the actual
conduct of the trial. One, a minor change, permits the court to appoint
an interpreter, including interpreters for the deaf, fix his compensation,
and direct who shall pay it. M4 The major changes concern proving
foreign documents and foreign lkw.
PROOF OF OFFICIAL RECORD-RULE 44
Under old rule 44 (a), both foreign and domestic official records had
to be proved and authenticated in the -same manner. Such records could
"be evidenced by [either] an official publication . . . or'by 'a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record . . . and ac-
companied with a certificate that such officer'[had]' . . . the custody."
The first alternative presented no problem. But since the 'rule "was
drafted with domestic official records primarily in mind,"155 compli-
ance with the second alternative in the case of foreign documents was,
in many instances, extremely arduous. While official records in the
United States have customarily been retained by' a- custodian who is
impliedly authorized to issue attested copies, many other countries do
not have such custodians., Thus, the rule has precluded the admissi-
bility of many otherwise accepta'ble foreign documents&-0 ,
The requirement of an accompanying certification by a representa-
tive of the United States "stationed in the foreign . . . country in
which the record [was] . . . kept" presented further difficulties: It
was impossible to certify copies from countries in which there Vas no
appropriate United States official. Moreover, assuming that a proper
official was present, it was a formidable,.if not impossible, task for him
The other change is to add the term "bailee" to the illustrative enumeration of
real parties in interest. The Advisory Committee commented that this was "primarily
to preserve the admiralty practice whereby the owner of a vessel as a bailee of the
cargo sues for damage to either property interest or both." Advisory Committee's Note
to new rule 17(a). In general civil practice a bailee has generally been.understood to
have the right to sue as a real party in interest, Bradley v. St. Louis Terminal Ware-
house Co., 189 F.2d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 1951), on, the ground that the substantive law
of the states gives him this right. Atkinson, supra at 949-50.
154 New rule 43 (f).
155 2B BARRON & HoLTzorF § 992, at 275. See generally Smit, Interzational Aspects
of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUn. L. REV. 1031 (1961).
IO E.g., United States v. Grabina, 119 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1941) (extract of records
certified by mayor of township inadmissible because mayor not certified as custodian).
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"to certify to the authority of the foreign official attesting the copy as
well as the genuineness of his signature and his official position."' 5 7
The authority of the attestor and his official position raised questions
of foreign law about which the certifying official often had insufficient
knowledge, with the result that he could not issue a certificate.
To remedy these unsatisfactory conditions, rule 44(a) has been
reorganized and amplified to provide separate procedures for authen-
ticating foreign and domestic copies of official records. The domestic
rules remain substantively the same, the only change being a more
specific designation of the geographical areas covered. The foreign
rules no longer require that the attesting officer must also be the cus-
todian of the record. The certification problem has been alleviated by
eliminating the necessity for confirming the authority of the attestor.
In the alternative, a chain certification method is permitted whereby
all that is necessary is certification of (1) the genuineness of the signa-
ture and (2) the lawfulness of the incumbency of a foreign official,
other than the attestor, who at someplace in a string relating to the
original attestation certified the genuineness of the original.5 8 The
final certification can be made by "a diplomatic or consular official of
the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States" as
well as by an American official. Finally, to mitigate any of the short-
comings of these changes, it is provided:
If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authen-
ticity and accuracy of the documents, the court may, for good cause shown, (i)
admit an attested copy without final certification or (ii) permit the foreign
official record to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without a final
certification. 15 9
The Advisory Committee notes that this should be allowed only after
reasonable efforts to comply with the other rules are unsuccessful.
157Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 44(a)(2); see Smit, supra note 155, at
1063; SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 57 (2d ed. 1959).
158 See, e.g., The Denny, 127 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1942); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Aronson, 38 F. Supp. 687 (W.D. Pa. 1941). Chain certification was not allowable under
the old rule because the United States official's certification had to refer to the attestor.
Professor Smit had asserted before the amendment that the probability of veracity
was not any less in chain certification than in direct certification. Smit, supra note 155,
at 1068.
159 New rule 44(a) (2). Previously summaries were not admissible. United States v.
Grabina, 119 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1941); ef. Delmore v. Brownell, 135 F. Supp. 470
(D.N.J. 1955), aff'd, 236 F,2d 598 (3d Cir. 1956). Significantly, certain countries issue
only summaries of some official records. Smit, supra note 155, at 1070.
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The new rule brings greater flexibility to this procedural area by
striking a balance between ihe often conflicting goals of unimpeach-
able authenticity and easy certification. The discretionary admission of
copies or summaries without final certification, however, may lead to
confusion and lack of uniformity in the courts. Nevertheless, this
must be weighed against the policy of deciding cases on the merits, a
seemingly worthier object. By providing that certification may be dis-
pensed with where all parties have had'a reasonable opportunity to in-
vestigate the authenticity and accuracy of the documents, the rule per-
mits the court to place the burden upon opposing counsel to* show
that there is a question conerning the document. Lacking such ques-
tion, there seems to be no need for the formality of final certification. 160
PROVING FOREIGN LAW-RULE 44.1
A need has arisen for a procedure to extricate the courts from. the
inapposite common-law-evolved methods for determining foreign
law. 10 New rule 44.1 is such an endeavor. By providing specific rules
for that which previously had been within the periphery of rules 8 (a),
43 (a), and 52 (a), it proposes a uniform and extensive procedure for
t'raising and determining" issues of foreign law. To appreciate the
scope of this new rule, an understanding of how the common-law rules
and their modifications have affected the federal courts is essential.
The foundation of the common-law doctrine is the principle that
foreign law must be proved as a fact. 162 Although treating law as
160Rule 44(b), relating to proof of lack of record, is changed solely to remain con-
sistent with the changes in section (a). Rule 44(c), relating to other proof, is changed
to include United States international agreements which provide "for reception of
copies or summaries of foreign official records."
161 See generally SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIE LAW 31-142 (2d ed. 1959) ; Keeffe, Landis
& Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REv. 664 (1950);
Nussbaum, Proof of Foreign Law in New York: A Proposed Amendment, 57 COLTUM. L.
REV. 348 (1957) ; Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 AM. J. CoMp. L.
60 (1954) ; Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018 (1941);
Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 23 (1957);
Note, 72 HARV. L. REv. 318 (1958.).
10 2 The reason for the rule is practical. The judge must be informed of the un-
familiar law and the easiest method is to have it proved as a fact is proved. See
SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 161, at 39-40; Keeffe, Landis & Shaad, supra note 161, at
674. Although in accord with the reason for the rule, critics have expressed dissatisfaction
with the treatment of foreign law as a fact for all purposes. See authorities cited note
161 supra.
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fict is unique, it 'has undesirably fallen within the scope of rules
designed to cover normal situations. Thus the particularly onerous
effects of this "fact doctrine" in the federal courts are threefold: (1)
foreign law must be raised in the pleadings; (2) it must be proved
in accordance with the applicable rules of evidence; and (3) since
it is a fact, it is rarely subject to appellate review. 03
That a party must give notice of reliance on foreign law is a neces-
sary concomitant of the "fact doctrine." Since foreign law is a factual
basis for relief, the adversary must be informed to prevent unfair
surprise, and the court must be informed to permit independent investi-
gation.0 4 This has traditionally been done in the pleadings. The
practice in the federal courts before the adoption of the federal
rules was that if it was unknown at the time of pleading that foreign
law would be relied on at trial and thus not pleaded, the party was
thereafter precluded from raising it.165
' The liberal pleading requirements of rule 8 (a) evoked divergent
views rather than a'reversal of'the old policy. The first cases decided
under the rules followed the traditional interpretation.10 However,
the'Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in Siegelman v.
Cunard Wf~hite Star, Ltd.,16 that "pleading the foreign law . . . [is]
clearly unnecessary" since "under Rule 8, [all that] a pleading must
contain [is] a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is' entitled to relief"; "it is not necessary to set out the
legal theory on which the claim is based."'0 8
Realizing that: raising an issue of foreign law is distinguishable
from the normal situation envisaged by the framers of 8(a), the
new rule specifically covers pleading of foreign law. It states that
''a party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign
163 SCHLESINGER, oP. cit. suora note 161, at 42-44.
164 Keeffe, Landis, & Shaad, supra note 161, at 685.
165 E.g., Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 445 (1889).
166 E.g., Harris v. American Int'l Fuel & Petroleum Co., 124 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa.
1954); Finne v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.y., 11 F.R.D. 336 (S.D.N.Y.
1951); United States v. National City Bank of New York, 7 F.R.D. 241 (S.D.N.Y.
1946); Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 57 F. Supp. 649
(S.D.N.Y. 1944); Chemacid, S.A. v. Ferrotar Corp., 3 F.R.D. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1942);
Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 1 F.R.D. 626 (E.D. Pa. 1941). The rationale of
these cases was criticized as contrary to the liberal pleading policy of rule 8,(a). Keeffc,
Landis & Shaad, supra note 161, at 685.
167 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
1 6 8 1d. at 196; see Pederson v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 95 (D. Guam 1961).
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country shall give notice in his pleadings or other reasonable notice."
This recognizes that although giving notice of intent to rely on
foreign law is essential, it is not necessary to plead such law.
The words "other reasonable notice" insure that the proponent
will give timely notice at peril of nonrecognition of his foreign law
claim, but notice is not necessarily late if it is given subsequent to
the pleadings. 6 9 The Advisory Committee mentions that notice need
only be given by one party; either party can thereafter raise foreign
law issues. This appears to make sense. The danger of unfair sur-
prise is foreclosed once the original notice has been given.
Under common-law concepts the applicable rules of evidence deter-
mine the correct procedure. The federal courts, under rule 43 (a),
apply either federal or state rules depending on which favors admis-
sibility.170 However, the peculiarity of proving law as a fact renders
normal evidentiary rules inappropriate, and as a result many merito-
rious cases have been denied fair adjudication.
In the adversary system, the methods allowed by the rules of
evidence for proving foreign law are limited. If the foreign law is
unwritten, in the absence of statutory modification, it must be proved
orally by expert witnesses.171 If it is written, it may additionally be
evidenced by official documents or their copies.'72 The use of expert
witnesses presents three problems, all of which hamper presentation
of the foreign law issue. The first is the difficulty of finding a qualified
expert. Since experts are apt to be located in large cities, their avail-
ability is often dependent upon proximity to such urban areas. More-
over, if the foreign country is an obscure one, the chances of finding
169 In determining what is reasonable, the Advisory Committee notes that the court
should consider, among other factors, the stage of the case at the time notice is
given, the reason for failure to give earlier notice, and the importance of the foreign
law issue to the case.
170This includes evidence admissible under the statutes of the United States or
under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the federal courts on the hearing
of suits in equity. There are few United States statutes or federal decisions concerning
equity evidence, and therefore, state rules of evidence are most often invoked. Keeffe,
Landis & Shaad, supra note 161, at 686, See generally WRiGHT, FEDERAL CouRTS § 93
(1963).
171A few jurisdictions allow proof by means of decisions of foreign courts or
distinguished treatises. Stern, supra note 161, at 26-27.
172 See generally Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J.
1018 (1941).
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an expert are minimal." The second, and most significant, is the
prohibitive cost of such experts, a fact which leaves the impecunious
plaintiff at a great disadvantage. 174 The third is the chance that a
skillful cross examiner can frequently destroy the testimony of the
expert. Since foreign law experts often lack complete command of
the English language, their oral version of the law can easily be
confused and rendered ineffective." 6  There are various problems
in using documentary evidence as well; these have been discussed
previously under rule 44. It can be seen, then, the rules of evidence
make it difficult, if not impossible, to present an issue of foreign law
to the court.
If a party is unable to prove the law, the failure may be deter-
minative of his cause. In Cuba R.R. v. Crosby,176 an American, in
Cuba, lost his hand as the result of the negligence of his American
employer. The impecunious plaintiff was unable to prove Cuban law,
but the district court held that in the absence of such proof, the law
of the forum applied and the jury found for the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that if the foreign law cannot be
proved, the complaint must be dismissed. The federal courts still
follow this case when they are not bound to apply a different state
rule of evidence. 7 Several states apply the law of the forum, as did
the district court in Crosby."8 Other states statutorily permit the
courts to take judicial notice of foreign law, unfettered by rules of
evidence ;79 however, in many cases the courts have refused to invoke
the statutes.8 0
New rule 44.1 was adopted in awareness of the inequitable results
a failure to prove foreign law often produces. It provides that "the
173 Id. at 1029. For a discussion of the problems of qualifying an expert see SCHLE-
SINGER, op. cit. supra note 161, at 59-111.
174 See generally Nussbaum, Proof of Foreign Law in New York: 4 Proposed Amend-
ment, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 348 (1957).
175 Ibid.
176 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
177 E.g., Ozanic v. United States, 165 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1948).
1 78 SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 161, at 127; see Note, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 701 (1954.).
Although this may often eliminate the harsh results of Crosby, it nevertheless enables a
party who can prove the foreign law to forum-shop. By comparing the probable out-
comes under both rules of law, a party, who can afford the cost of proving the foreign
law, may decline to do so if the law of the forum would be more favorable. See generally
SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 161, at 128.
179 E.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4511.
180 E.g., Arams v. Arams, 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1943).
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court, in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material
or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party
or admissible under Rule 43." This clause permits federal courts
to free themselves of the heretofore inhibiting rules of evidence.
The rule is unquestionably salutary. Under it, the court can engage
in its own research and raise its own issues (as it does in the case of
domestic law), without being limited to properly admitted evidence.
A party unable to afford or acquire an expert will not be automati-
cally at a disadvantage. In short, the court will be able to do justice
to the extent the available facilities allow.""
While the Advisory Committee recognizes that ordinarily the court
should inform the parties of extrarecord material that it proposes
to use, 8 2 so as to give them the opportunity to analyze and counter,
it did not wish to add an "element of undesirable rigidity" by
requiring such procedure. Here lies the greatest danger in the rule.
For unless a court has the duty to find all the foreign law, permitting
it to pick a fragment of foreign law, to construe the fragment as
pertinent, and then to apply it without advising counsel could lead
to an unjust result. As long as counsel is still bound by evidentiary
rules in foreign law matters, he would be unable to counter a fragment
of foreign law not in evidence. This, it is submitted, is an unhealthy
mixture of requiring proof by counsel on the one hand and allowing
181 The rule states that the court may consider testimony other than that submitted
by the parties; this means court-appointed experts. However, the courts had authority to
do this previously. SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 161, at 110. The problem then was that
the court had no authority to pay experts and, thus, they were rarely called. The same
problem will exist under the new rule. It has been suggested by Professor Nussbaum that
the court could include the cost of an expert as part of the court's business, in which case
the losing party will ultimately pay the price. Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign
Countries, 3 AM. J. COMp. L. 60, 66-67 (1954). Professor Schlesinger suggests, however,
that this would possibly be beyond a judge's power, absent a statute, and that the only
answer to the problem is a statutory provision, whereby experts could receive remunera-
tion out of public funds or some other source. If a statute is needed to permit routine
use of court-appointed experts, it should be seriously considered, since use of such
experts would greatly enhance the possibility of deciding foreign law issues in those
cases in which the court is unable to avail itself of any pertinent information as to
the foreign law.
182 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 44.1; see SCHLESINGER, op. cit. sura note 161,
at 142. He states that it is arguable that a duty to give notice exists "even in the
absence of express statutory language, and that a violation of this judicial duty
constitutes reversible error."
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the court to take judicial notice on the other.83 The only safeguard
in such a system would be court-made permission for counsel to offer
in his post-trial motions or appellate briefs additional evidence of
where the district court's fragment resulted in an erroneous conclu.
sion. This of course presupposes that he learns of what fragment the
district court used.
The third effect of the common law "fact doctrine" is the limited
review in foreign law matters. If an issue of foreign law necessitated
proof by experts, the determination of such law was a function of
the jury. 84 The rule gradually was dissipated by statute and judicial
decision so that today, in a majority of states, it is a question for
the courts.8 5 Several federal courts, unaided by statute have reached
the same conclusion,'8" but in many it still remains a jury question.
Whether this was considered a jury or court function, an issue of
foreign law was still a question of fact in the federal courts subject
to appellate review only if "clearly erroneous" under rule 52(a).187
This fact evoked the criticism of several writers.' They contended
that if subject to appellate review, issues of foreign law would be
decided more consistently with the prior decisions of the forum as
well as those of the foreign country. Their view is consonant with
the reality that foreign law is more than mere fact. 8 9
183 See generally SCHLESINGER, op. cit. suPra note 161, at 12943. The Committee notes
that use of the concept of judicial notice is avoided to prevent an "extreme burden" on the
court and to escape the uncertainty of that concept as applied to foreign law. The
new rule itself vitiates the latter aim, since the court can, in effect, take judicial
notice by means of its own research.
184 SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 161, at 43 ; Keeffe, Landis & Shaad, supra note 161, at
674; Stem, supra note 161, at 27.
185 SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 161, at 43-44.
186 Daniel Lumber Co. v. Empresas Hondurenas, S.A., 215 F.2d 465, 470 (5th Cir.
1954) ; Liechti v. Roche, 198 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Jansson v. Swedish American
Line, 185 F.2d 212, 216 (1st Cir. 1950).
187E.g., Remington Rand, Inc. v. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Indus-
trielles et Commerciales, S.A., 88 U.S. App. D.C. 275, 277, 188 F.2d 1011, 1013 (1951).
188 See Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1033
(1941) ; Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. 318, 323 (1958). But see SCHLE8INOGt op. cit. supra note
161, at 44 n.8. Twenty-seven states have adopted Section 3 of the Uniform Judicial Notice
of Foreign Law Act, 9A U.L.A. 562 (1965), which provides for appellate review.
189 Further, the change in the new rule itself, permitting independent judicial in-
vestigation, increases the need for appellate review. Now that the chances of proving
foreign law are greater, uniformity is desirable to the same extent it is with respect
to domestic law.
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The new rule responds to that reality; it provides that "the court's
determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law." As
noted by the Advisory Committee, the new rule does not control
who should make the determination since the rules do not regulate
allocation between judge and jury.'10 Therefore, although implicitly
favoring court determination of foreign law, the new provision will
only have effect where this is presently permitted.
JURORS-RULE 47
To reduce the incidence of the often calamitous mistrial caused by
a disminished jury, rule 47 has been amended to increase the maximum
number of alternate jurors from two to six. Concomitant to this
change is an increase in the number of possible peremptory challenges
from one to three, depending upon the number of alternate jurors
that are impanelled. The only other change allows the replacement
of jurors who "become or are found to be unable or disqualified to
perform their duties." This is to indicate clearly that a mistrial need
not be declared when it is first discovered during the trial that a
juror was disqualified at the time he was sworn. 91 .An alternate juror
may be called to replace him.
JUDGMENTS
NEW TRIAL-RULE 59
To rule 59 (d) is added a sentence giving a judge the power to
grant a new trial on a ground not mentioned in a timely motion for
new trial. This change was occasioned by the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Freid v.
McGrath.92 In that case the court held that although a judge could
grant a new trial on grounds other than those mentioned in a motion
for new trial, in so doing he was acting on his own initiative and
190 Such determinations must be made in light of the seventh amendment, and there-
fore, it is not proper to do so by way of a new federal rule. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
191 See United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1964). This was a criminal
case in which the appellant argued that under FaD. R. CRiM. P. 24(c), which had the
same provision as rule 47(b), a mistrial resulted because a juror, who was disqualified
at the time she was sworn in, was not discovered and dismissed until during the trial.
The denial of the motion for a mistrial was affirmed. 330 F.2d at 43.
192 76 U.S. App. D.C. 388, 133 F.2d 350 (1942).
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was thus bound by the restriction in old rule 59 (d) :-1" "Not later
than ten days after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative
may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted
a new trial on motion of a party . . . .,,0 The effect of the holding
was that when a judge was considering a timely motion for new
trial and the ten-day period had expired, he was limited to the specific
grounds urged in the motion. He was without power to grant a new
trial on any other grounds, no matter how meritorious. 15 Similarly,
later cases held that when a timely motion had been made and the ten-
day period provided by rule 59 (b) had run, the party making the
motion could not move to amend to add new grounds.00 From its
inception, this interpretation of rules 59 (b) and (c) was criticized as
preventing the court from doing substantial justice.17
In attempting to change the .'undesirable" result reached under
the old rule, the Advisory Committee first proposed a change in
rule 59 (b) which would have allowed both amendment of a timely
motion and the granting of the motion on grounds not stated therein. 08
The amendment as adopted omits any provision for amendment of
19 3 Id. at 393, 133 F.2d at 355.
1 9 4 FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d).
195 Demeretz v. Daniels Motor Freight, Inc., 307 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1962); National
Farmers Union Auto & Cas. Co. v. Wood, 207 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1953); Marshall's
U.S. Auto Supply, Inc. v. Cashman, 111 F.2d 140 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
677 (1940). See also 6 MooPE, FEDERAL PRAcrxcE 59.09 [3], at 3851 n.9 (2d ed. 1953), and
cases cited therein.
196Russell v. Monongahela Ry., 262 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1958); Francis v. Southern
Pac. Co., 162 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1947), aff'd, 333 U.S. 445 (1948) ; Brest v. Philadelphia
Trans. Co., 24 F.R.D. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Marks v. Philadelphia Wholesale Drug Co.,
125 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1954), aft'd, 222 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1955).
197There is no logical or legal difficulty in granting for one reason a motion made
for another reason. And it seems to me a contradiction in terms to say, when a
judge grants a party's motion, that he nevertheless acts upon his own motion; or,
what comes to the same thing, that he acts of his own initiative.
Freid v. McGrath, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 388, 394, 133 F.2d 350, 356 (1942) (Edgerton, J.,
dissenting). See also Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 36 F.R.D. 253
(E.D. La. 1964), where the court examined the authorities in favor of the general
rule and declined to follow it.
198 (b) Time for Motion. A motion for new trial shall be served not later than
10 days after the entry of judgment. After a motion has been thus timely served,
the court in its discretion may (1) upon application and notice 'while the motion is
pending, permit the moving party to amend the motion to state different or ad-
ditional grounds; (2) grant the pending motion upon grounds not stated by the
moving party and in that case the court shall specify the grounds in its order.
Preliminary Draft 404-05 (new matter in italics).
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a motion for new trial after the running of the ten-day period. The
change between the early and final drafts was probably motivated
by a fear that allowing amendment of the new trial motion after
the running of the ten-day period would prolong and complicate
consideration of the motion. However, in light of the provision
in the new rule that each party must be given notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard before the judge may grant a new trial on grounds
not urged in the motion, there appears to be little reason why the
court should not be permitted discretion to allow this same process
to be commenced by an application to amend the original motion. 99
PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES
INJUNCTIONS-RULE 65
Rule 65 has been changed in three respects: (1) A new para-
graph has been added to 65 (a) giving express authority to consoli-
date a hearing for a preliminary injunction with trial on the merits;
(2) new matter has been added to 65(b) requiring that every
practical step be taken to give the opposition a chance to be heard
before issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (3) the
language in 65(c) providing for summary proceedings against
sureties has been transferred substantially verbatim to new rule 65.1.
The amendment to 65 (a), in the words of the Judicial Conference
of the Ninth Circuit, "merely gives express authority for what is
already sometimes done. '20 0 The Advisory Committee itself says:
"The subdivision is believed to reflect the substance of the best cur-
rent practice and introduces no novel conception." 201 Consolidation,
the committee feels, will avoid the wasted time and energy sometimes
involved when evidence introduced at the hearing must be reintroduced
at the trial.0 2
109 In the note to the original draft the Committee said:
It is not contemplated that the revised rule shall be availed of to permit an amend-
ment which merely elaborates upon the grounds stated in the original motion. An
application for permission to amend the motion should in all events be made as
promptly as possible. As the grant or denial of an application is in the court's
discretion, it may take into account all relevant considerations, including delay in
making the application.
Ibid.
200 Comm. on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference-Ninth Circuit,
Report, 36 F.R.D. 209, 235 (1964).
201 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 65 (a).
202 Ibid.
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In addition, the new rule provides, "even when this consolidation
is not ordered, any evidence received upon an application for a pre-
liminary injunction which would be admissible upon the trial on the
merits becomes a part of the record on the trial and need not be
repeated upon the trial." It should be noted that this sentence is
permissive only; and if necessary to give coherence to the presentation
at trial, as it often must be, the evidence may be repeated. While
the amendment, as noted above, in no way changes presently per-
missible practice, it is thought that it will have the salutary effect
of encouraging a wider use of the consolidation procedure. 20 3
New 65 (b) favors notifying the opposing party of a petition for
a temporary restraining order. It attempts to encourage the giving
of informal notice whenever possible, if formal notice is impossible
or impractical. The old rule required that notice be given unless it
appears that "immediate and irreparable injury . . . will result to
the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon."
To some, the old rule indicated that if for some reason it was impos-
sible to serve formal notice on a party, there was no obligation to
telephone information of the impending hearing to the party or his
attorney. The new rule requires the applicant's attorney to certify in
writing "the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the notice and
the reasons supporting his claim that notice should not be required."
The fairness of giving the opposing party a right to be heard
coupled with the potentially serious effects of an unwisely granted
temporary restraining order, makes the amendment desirable. Fur-
ther, it appears in line with the little judicial comment available.204
The amendment to 65 (c) is of no practical significance. It merely
gathers in one new section substantially identical provisions formerly
found in rules 65 and 73, and makes provision for applicability to
maritime actions.
APPEALS
The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules issued in March 1964
a Preliminary Draft of Proposed Uniform Rules of Federal Appellate
Procedure. Apparently acting on the conclusion that authority does
203 Comm. on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference-Ninth Circuit,
Report, 36 F.R.D. 209, 235 (1964).
204 See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Transport Workers Union, 278
F.2d 693, 694 (3d, Cir. 1960) ; Arvida Corp. v. Sugarman, 259 F.2d 428, 429 (2d Cir. 1958).
not now exist to promulgate uniform rules for the federal appellate
courts, 205 the Supreme Court did not issue such rules along with the
amendments to the federal rules of civil and criminal procedure.
But in the promulgated amendments to the civil and criminal rules,
changes are made that alter district court procedure attendant to the
appeal process.
This section will present an examination of those changes affecting
appeals taken in civil cases. However, it should be noted that when
uniform appellate rules are promulgated, they will be applicable in
general to both civil and criminal proceedings. Changes in criminal ap-
pellate procedure at the district court level are treated at pages
1276 through 1318 below. Although there will be some compari-
son with present practice, a full development of the comparisons will
be omitted since it was recently presented by the author in other pages
of this same volume.20 6
It should be emphasized that, as there is no statutory authority to
promulgate generally applicable rules of appellate procedure, the rules
adopted by the Supreme Court pertain solely to the district courts.
Thus, as concerns appeals, they regulate the taking of an appeal up
to its docketing in the appellate court. Beyond that point, procedure
is controlled by the rules of the various courts of appeals. Neverthe-
less, these amendments work some significant alterations in today's
procedure as well as codify some practice that has arisen despite
contrary provisions in the existing civil and criminal rules.
The period for noting an appeal specified by rule 73 (a) is left
unchanged in ordinary civil cases.207 But the time period in admiralty
cases is now changed to conform with civil cases generally.
208
205 Cohn, The Proposed Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 431,
436-38 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Cohn].20 0 
Id. at 431-81.
207 In civil cases, the time is thirty days unless the government or an agency or
officer thereof is a party, in which case the time is sixty days. Fan. R. Crv. P. 73 (a).
These time limits are also instituted by 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1964).
208 Previously, the time to appeal in admiralty cases was ninety days after final orders
and fifteen days after interlocutory orders. 28 U.S.C. §-2107 (1964).
Other exceptions remain. Bankruptcy appeals are not governed by these rules. Fan.
R. Civ. P. 81(a) (1). Rather, they are governed by separate time limits: thirty days
after notice to the losing party of the entry of judgment or order if proof of service of
that notice is filed within five days of the service itself. If there is no such service
or proof of service, appeal time is forty days. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 855,
11 U.S.C. § 48 (1964). Another exception is appeal of arbitration board awards under
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In both the civil and criminal rules, there is a widening of the court's
power to extend the time period for appeals. This power in civil
cases was limited by the old rule to cases of "excusable neglect based
upon a failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment." 200
However, some decisional law permitted extensions in cases con-
sidered extraordinary even though this condition was not met.210
The amended civil rule will now permit district courts to grant
thirty-day extensions of time to note an appeal if there is "excusable
neglect" but without limitation as to the reason for this neglect."
The Advisory Committee's Note to rule 73, however, makes it clear
that:
In view of the ease with which an appeal may be perfected, no reason other than
failure to learn of the entry of judgment should ordinarily excuse a party from
the requirement that the notice be timely filed. But the district court should
have authority to permit the notice to be filed out of time in extraordinary cases
where injustice would otherwise result.
Although the amended criminal rules allow the court to extend the
time for noting an appeal sua sponte either before or after the time
has expired,212 in civil cases, this power must be exercised before the
the Railway Labor Act, for which only ten days are provided. 44 Stat. 585 (1926), as
amended, 45 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
This author has noted elsewhere his belief that it would be of significant advantage
to end these exceptions to an otherwise uniform rule. See generally Cohn 447-48. An
express exception for interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964), FED. R.
Civ. P. 73(a)(4), does not fall within this reasoning, for a statutory scheme has
fostered much appellate court rulemaking to govern this matter. See generally Note,
54 GEo. L.J. 940 (1966). It is hoped that when appellate rules are adopted, differences
between the courts of appeals' rules governing 1292(b) appeals can also be eliminated.
200 This provision of the old rule was based on 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1964).
210 Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203 (1964) (per curiam, 5-to-4 decision) ; Thompson
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 384 (1964) (5-to4 decision); Harris
Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215 (1962) ("unique cir-
cumstances").
211Although the amended rule thus widens the exception so as to include these
extraordinary instances in which the Supreme Court sanctioned the grant of an extension,
the author believes that the possible injustice prevented is purchased at too high a
price. See generally Cohn 44647.
It should be noted that the Advisory Committee's Note to the amended criminal rule
contains no such limiting language. This difference may not have been intentional since
we are dealing with two different advisory committees. But it would be justified
if it were intentional, for there is less reason for a flexible rule in civil cases than in
criminal cases. The necessity for ending litigation so that private persons may act
on the judgment is not present in criminal cases.
212 New criminal rule 37(a) (2).
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period for noting an appeal has expired. After this period, the rule
remains that the time may be extended only on motion.2 18
Perhaps the most startling change ends the opportunity in civil
cases for one party to prevent other parties from taking cross
appeals by filing his notice of appeal on the last permissible day. Meet-
ing the time requirement is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the
appellate court.214 And unless the period for noting an appeal were
extended for the narrowly circumscribed reasons under the old rule,2 15
the noting of an appeal after the expiration of that time could not
bestow jurisdiction to hear the case on the court of appeal.216 An
appellee may generally not attack an independent holding favorable
to the appellant or seek to better his own position on appeal without
having filed a cross appeal.1 Thus, when one party waits until the
last moment to appeal, or for some other reason the appellee does
not learn of the appeal until the time has expired, the appellee may
be precluded from seeking affirmative relief that he would otherwise
desire on appeal.18
218 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 73; FED. R. Civ. P. 6 (b).
2 1 4 WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 104, at 406 (1963).
215 See note 210 supra and accompanying text.
216Spengler v. Hughes Tool Co., 169 F.2d 166, 167 (10th Cir. 1948); see Harris
Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 216 (1962); FDIC v.
Congregation Poiley Tzedeck, 159 F.2d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 1946).
217 International Milling Co. v. Brown S.S. Co., 264 F.2d 803, 804 (2d Cir. 1959)
(admiralty proceeding); see Guiberson Corp. v. Equipment Engineers Inc., 252 F.2d
431, 432 (5th Cir. 1958) (patent); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 104, at 408 (1963).
He may, of course, defend the judgment on any ground, including one rejected by the
district court. Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281 (1957) ; Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S.
531, 538 (1931) (admiralty proceeding); United States v. American Ry. Express Co.,
265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924).
218The Supreme Court now has pending before it a similar question involving its
own jurisdiction. In the case of Florida E.C. Ry. v. United States, 348 F.2d 682 (Sth
Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. WEEK: 3253-54 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1966) (Nos. 750,
782, 783), on the eighty-seventh day after the Fifth Circuit decided partially in favor
of the United States and partially in favor of the railroad, the Government appealed
to Mr. Justice Black for an extension of time in which to file a petition. (The time
for filing a petition, ninety days, like the time for filing an appeal, is jurisdictional,
Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 418 (1923), but it may be ex-
tended upon application, 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (1964). Although the statute does not
preclude it, previous reported motions have been within the time to petition.) The
government's motion was granted. On the ninety-eighth day, after the expiration of
the time to petition, the railroad requested that the order extending the time for the
Government to petition be amended so as to include all other parties. On this applica-
tion, Mr. justice Black, on November 6, 1965, ruled: "Motion granted if within my
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The amended rule 73 (a) (3) permits "any other party"210 to file
an appeal of his own "within 14 days of the date on which the first
notice of appeal was filed," if the first appellant files an appeal less
than fourteen days from the end of the period for appeal. 2 0 Thus,
once an appeal is filed, all other parties are guaranteed fourteen
days in which to learn of that fact221 and file their own appeals if they
so desire.222
Changes have been made relating to service of notice of appeal.
This is still to be accomplished by the clerk of the district court;
and in civil cases, the rule remains that the attorney of record for
all parties other than the appellant (or a party if pro se) is to be
served. But a change in 73 (b) requires that the copy served reflect
the date of filing. The Advisory Committee notes that this require-
ment is "for the convenience of counsel" ;223 this will serve to notify
other parties of the time they have to appeal if the first appellant
filed his appeal within fourteen days of the end of the normal or
previously extended period.
Certain changes are made to the civil rules pertaining to security
for costs. Rule 73 (c) adds to the alternatives available for pro-
viding for costs on appeal. Besides the previously available super-
sedeas bond, appellant may file any "other undertaking which includes
security" or "deposit other equivalent security" for costs. This
power to do so." In support of the Justice's power to so amend the order, counsel for
the railroad argued that (1) the Court has in the past considered causes of appellees
who had not filed cross-appeals, (2) the statute does not prohibit such amendment, (3)
by granting an extension as to one party, the Court preserved its jurisdiction over all
parties to the original action, and (4) judges have the inherent power to amend orders.
Petitions filed by the government, the railroad, and the union were granted on January 24,
1966, and argument was had on April 20, 1966.
219Thus this right is not restricted to opposing parties. See Advisory Committee's
Note to new rule 73.
220As a statute prescribes the time to appeal, note 207 supra, it may be contended
that this change is beyond the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court. However,
since the enabling act permits the rules to override statutes on procedural matters, 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1964), this author has argued that the change is valid. See generally
Cohn 44-546.
221 The clerk of the district court is directed by new rule 73 (b) to mail a copy of the
notice to counsel of all other parties.
222The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules originally proposed a seven-day
period. Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Federal
Rules, 34 F.R.D. 263, 273 (1964).
223 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 73.
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change incorporates common admiralty practice. The amendment
also adds a provision that no security will be required when the
appellant is not subject to costs. Cases are thus covered in which
the party is exempted from paying costs, not by law, but by rule of
the particular appellate court. An addition to rule 73 (d), consonant
with amended rule 73 (c), provides that no separate supersedeas bond
is required when sufficient security has already been given in the
district court. Again, this reflects the common practice in maritime
proceedings.
The last changes of significance in civil rule 73 occur in section (g).
Language is altered to make clearer the affirmative duty of appellant
to see that the court of appeals received the record and that the
appeal is docketed within the time permitted. This includes the
payment of the docket fee if one is required. The limitation of
forty days for the sending of the record and the docketing of the
case is retained,224 but the flexibility allowed the district courts in
granting extensions of this time is in one respect expanded and in
others reduced. It is expanded in that the district court can now
issue an order extending the time to docket after that time has expired
if it is acting on a motion made before the time expired. But, if the
district court acts sua sponte, it must act within the original forty-
day period.225 Extension is restricted in that a motion for extension
of time in which to docket must now show that the appellant's inabil-
ity to file and docket in time "is due to causes beyond his control or
to circumstances which may be deemed excusable neglect. ' 22
6
224 It is unfortunate that the original recommendation of the Advisory Committee
on Appellate Rules is not reflected at this point in the amended rules. That Committee
recommended that the rule be altered to provide only that the record be "transmitted"
rather than requiring it to be filed at the appellate court within the time period.
Proposed Fed. R. Appellate P. 11(a). By this language, the Committee intended it
to be sufficient that the record be sent to the appellate court by the end of forty days,
rather than requiring it to leave the district court in time to travel to the appellate court
and be filed there within forty days. Thus, district courts located substantial distances
from their appellate courts (for example, Alaska to San Francisco) would not have been
required to send the record substantially before the expiration of the time, and counsel
would have known with certainty how long the record would be available for their
use at the district court.
225 In this respect, the rule for extension of time to docket is more stringent than
that pertaining to extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal. As was noted
previously the latter time may be extended on motion made after the time has expired.
2 2 6 As this author has noted previously, Cohn 452, there is reason for retaining the
present unlimited discretion to grant extensions in civil cases. Counsel frequently use
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Civil rule 75 regulating the record on appeal has been completely
rewritten due in large part to the fact that the old provisions are
now obsolete.227 Sections (a) through (g) of the old rule provided
for the forwarding to the court of appeals of certified copies of
designated portions of the district court record, but the former
75(o) gave the courts of appeals the alternative of permitting the
appeal to be heard on the original papers. Since every circuit chose
the latter alternative, the first five subdivisions have been stricken
from the rule. In their stead, new rule 75 (a) provides that the
record on appeal shall consist of the original papers and exhibits
filed in the district court, the transcript of the proceedings, if any,
and the district court docket entries.
Reinforced by sections (e) and (f), new rule 75(a) provides
that, on stipulation of the parties or by order of the district court, all
or a part of the record need not be sent to the appellate court thus
making it available for use by the district court or for preparation of
the appellate briefs. These records shall still be considered part of
the record on appeal and are subject to transmittal at the order of the
appellate court. Each party also has the right to request the trans-
mittal of designated portions of the record at any time.
This is a salutary provision. Since some district courts are hundreds
and even thousands of miles from their appellate courts, the record
would be unavailable to counsel for preparation if the original papers
were sent to the appellate court. For this reason the geographically
large Eighth Circuit has permitted the record to stay in the district
court. It is unfortunate, however, that the amended rule requires an
order which must be entered in every case, rather than permitting a
district court far removed from the seat of the appellate court to
accomplish the same result in a singular manner by general rule of
court.
To reduce the necessity for extensions of time in which to file the
record and docket the appeal, the Committee adopted in 75 (b) the
much of the ninety-day period (the maximum extension a judge can order) to resolve
the question of whether the appeal will be pursued. Often bearing on this question
is the possibility of settlement without appeal. Although the necessity of docketing and
paying the requisite fee may force some litigation to end at an earlier date, restricting
the grant of extension motions may well cause an increase in the transmittal of
records in cases for which appeals will never be prosecuted.
227 Advisory Committee's Note to new rule 75; WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 104, at 408
(1963).
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Fifth Circuit requirement 228 that the appellant, if he requires the trans-
script for appeal, must order it within ten days of noting the appeal.
If he does not order the whole transcript, he must serve on the appel-
lee a designation of that portion which he has ordered and a statement
of the issues he intends to raise on appeal. If the appellant intends to
argue that the decision of the district court is unsupported by the
evidence, he is required to order a transcript containing all evidence
relevant to that finding. The appellee is given the right to cross-
designate additional portions of the transcript he deems to be neces-
sary within ten days. Provision is also made that, should the transcript
not be available or should there be no report of the evidence, the
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence from whatever
sources he has at hand, subject to settlement of disagreements by the
district court.
The Advisory Committee's Note makes clear the intent that the
statement of issues to be raised on appeal, required by 75 (b) when a
partial designation of the transcript is made, is not to be deemed the
equivalent of the once required but now obsolete assignment of errors;
nor are the issues on appeal limited to those set forth in the state-
ment.
29
Other provisions of new rule 75 provide for the simplified correc-
tion or modification of the record, the treatment of bulky documents
and physical exhibits, the transmittal of a partial record needed for a
preliminary hearing, and the return of the record to the district court
after the appeal has been disposed of.
Thus the provisions of the civil rules have been revised so as to
bring the rules concerning the district court portion of appellate prac-
tice into conformity with present practice and to solve several prob-
lems that have developed under the old rules.
These amendments are not a substitute for uniform rules of appel-
late procedure; they neither purport nor have the authority to affect
procedure within the appellate courts themselves. The solution of
problems raised by the always diverse, sometimes anachronistic, and
often expensive practice of the appellate courts remains for another
day.
22 8 5'IH CIR. R. 23(3).
229 As previously noted by this author, this situation raises a question of costs. See
generally Cohn 451 n.116.
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